Labour after Globalisation: Old and New Sources of Power

Edward Webster

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About the Author

Edward Webster is a Professor Emeritus at the Society, Work and Development Institute (SWOP) at the University of the Witwatersrand, and Director of the Chris Hani Institute, both in Johannesburg, South Africa. He is also a Visiting Professor in the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Rhodes University.

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The nature of globalisation’s impact on workers is contested, both in the workplace and on the streets. Paul Bowles (2010) identifies two dominant paradigms. The first, the neoclassical liberal paradigm, views a liberal trading order as the main manifestation of globalisation, and beneficial to the majority of workers. It accepts that there will be job losses and growing wage inequality, and believes that the best way for workers in industrial countries to respond is by increasing their human capital through job retraining. The solution to the globalization problematic, neo-liberals believe (Bowles, 2010: 16),

is for the adjustment costs to be minimized perhaps by protection from import surges, but more importantly by longer term retraining programs which shift workers in industrial countries out of those industries in which developing countries have a comparative advantage.

The second paradigm, which Bowles terms anti-neo-liberal globalism, starts from the proposition that globalisation is a political project to increase the power of capital over the nation state and labour. Workers’ responses vary from global social democracy to support for ‘delinking’ from the global capitalist system. The policy instruments for labour include corporate codes of conduct, including the demand for a social clause in trade agreements, international framework agreements, global unionism, international minimum wage campaigns, international labour standards, regulation of global capital, and re-establishing the political autonomy of the state (Bowles, 2010: 17–20).

There is, however, a third paradigm emerging which challenges the conventional ‘end of labour’ thesis expressed by leading social scientists such as Manuel Castells (1996) and Guy Standing (2010). Instead of dismissing labour as a product of the past, this approach sees labour as an active agent responding to globalisation in innovative ways. It takes as its point of departure the assumption that the labour movement was built around its capacity to disrupt the economy (its structural power within the workplace) and its ability to organise collectively into trade unions and political parties (associational power) (Piven, 2000; Wright, 2002, Silver, 2004). While structural power has been weakened by neo-liberal globalisation, and associational power is under attack by the ideologues of the ‘free market’, new sources of power are emerging. One of these is logistical power, a form of structural power where disruptive politics are drawn from the workplace into the public arena (Webster, Lambert and Bezuidenhout, 2008: 13). Another is societal power, which depends on unions’ ability to frame their struggle in ways that aim at organising a counter-hegemonic force, based on cooperative power through coalition-building with social movements or discourse power through influencing public discourses around issues of justice. Jennifer Chun (2009) has called these symbolic or moral power. Using these forms of power, union organisers have successfully drawn on the public arena with the aim of restoring the dignity of and justice for socially devalued and economically marginalised workers. She demonstrates the use of symbolic power through an analysis of public demonstrations by caddies in Korea, and janitors and home care workers in California (Chun, 2009).

In this paper I focus on building a conceptual framework for an understanding of the changing dynamics of labour and workers’ sources of power. I begin by identifying worker action that draws on traditional sources of structural and associational power. I then show how the emergence of new forms of labour action is drawing on both old and new sources of power. New global forms of worker power are examined, and I conclude by suggesting that the missing dimension in the three sources of power identified – structural, associational and societal – is institutional power. If these new initiatives are to be sustainable they will need to include one of labour’s traditional sources of power, institutional power. These four-fold sources of power provide the basis for a strategy of union renewal in the age of globalisation.
1. Sources of Workers’ Power

Contrary to the ‘end of labour’ prognosis, strikes and uprisings have become commonplace worldwide. South Africa is no exception. Since 2006 strike activity has increased in duration, number of workdays lost and levels of violence (Webster, 2013: 349). Indeed, Alexander (2012) has argued that South Africa is ‘the protest capital of the world’, describing these protests as a ‘rebellion of the poor’, and linking them to labour-related demands for increases in wages, demands for jobs and improved service delivery. These protests are symptomatic of larger issues (Jain, 2010: 10):

> At the most fundamental level, community protests are a natural and probable consequence of systematic institutional problems that exist in the provision of basic services to the most poverty-stricken members of South African society.

A turning point for South Africa was the Marikana Massacre in August 2012, in which striking workers and policemen clashed, resulting in 34 deaths, the largest number of civilians killed by security forces since the end of apartheid (Alexander, 2012). In the incidents leading up to the massacre, workers, policemen and security guards were killed. While the employer, Lonmin, refused to talk to its striking workers, the dispute was complicated by the emergence of a break-away union – the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (AMCU) – from the previously hegemonic National Union of Mineworkers (NUM).

From the outset, workers rejected representation by NUM, the recognised union, and the formal collective bargaining system. The massacre at Marikana brought sharply to the fore the changing nature of the employment relationship in the age of globalisation and the emergence of new actors in the workplace. As Cooke and Wood (2011: 3) argue,

> the growing inadequacy of the traditional institutional actors (e.g. the state and national unions) in defending workers’ rights has created both the space and the need for “new” actors to fill the gap. Examples of these actors include: NGOs, employment agencies, HR consultancy firms, counsellors, chaplains, health advisors/trainers, citizens’ advice bureaus, global union federations, employment arbitrators, grassroots activists and social movements, and so forth.

All of these new actors, and more, were present in Marikana. Most significant were the large number of temporary employment agencies, side-by-side with grassroots activists, traditional healers, chaplains and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

But popular protest is not peculiar to South Africa; it is a global phenomenon in which the financialisation of capitalism has substantially altered the grammar of social conflict. From the Arab Spring to the ‘movement of the squares’ in Southern Europe, streets have become the sites of massive demonstrations, strikes, occupations, riots, rebellions and revolutions. The places where these popular uprisings have occurred include Tunisia, Egypt, Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Brazil and Turkey. Institutionalised industrial conflict is being eroded and the labour market is fragmenting society along new fault-lines. Alongside the decline of traditional unions, new movements are emerging. As Klaus Dörre (2010: 66) writes:

> What is crucial is that even in developed countries, collective (labour) interests are often articulated outside the scope of normalised conflict. In abandoned neighbourhoods and regions, “bargaining by riots” is quite common, a practise which despite the undeniable relevance of ethnic or gender-specific constructions, originates to a great extent in spontaneous or unconventionally organized class action.
These protests are class-specific bread-and-butter conflicts in which protesters feel powerless in the face of the international financial institutions and vent their anger in the destruction of property and in militant forms of action.

It is important to note that these new initiatives, organisational forms and sources of power are emerging at the periphery of traditional labour, leading to the flowering of a new global labour studies. Importantly, the strikes at Marikana were not led by a union, but were a product of the self-activity of workers, as Sinwell and Mbatha (2013: 32) argue:

_The agency of workers, and more specifically the independent worker’s committee, is arguably the key feature surrounding the event of the Marikana Massacre. The committee at Marikana is important in understanding the strike wave along the Rustenburg Platinum Belt where these independent organisations emerged. Industrial sociology more generally has been dominated by investigations into formalised unions._

Underlying this analysis are historical critiques of formal industrial relations structures from a broadly syndicalist perspective.

Another example is that of informal workers in India. Rina Agarwala (2013: 98) challenges the conventional view that informalisation is the ‘final nail in the labour movement’s coffin’. Informal workers, she demonstrates, are creating new institutions and forging a new social contract between the state and labour. Agarwala shows how informal worker movements are most successful when operating within electoral contexts where parties must compete for mass votes from the poor. She calls this competitive populism. These informal worker organisations are not attached to a particular party nor do they espouse a specific political or economic ideology. In this way they have successfully organised informal workers. As one organiser observed (cited in Agarwala, 2013: 98):

_The informal sector is entering into the previously formal sector, and the formal sector is being cut in size. We cannot differentiate between formal and informal workers, because politicians only care about getting most votes._

I am not suggesting that organising informal workers is an easy task. From research among vulnerable immigrant clothing workers in the inner city of Johannesburg, we found that these workers often operate in family-type microenterprises that blur the boundaries between employer and employee (Joynt and Webster, 2013). Instead of joining unions, they prefer faith-based organisations, such as the growing number of Pentecostal churches, which often perform economic as well as spiritual functions. They assist in job searches, find accommodation for newcomers to the city, and even act as ‘bankers’ by carrying money to home villages.

Be that as it may, research into the organisation of informal workers also shows the emergence of newer forms of power.

I illustrate the changing sources of workers’ power in the matrix shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Old and New Sources of Workers’ Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Traditional’ forms of workers’ power</th>
<th>Structural power:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Market place bargaining power</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Workplace bargaining power</td>
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<td>Example: the ability to disrupt production through strikes</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>‘New’ forms of workers’ power</th>
<th>Logistical power:</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Example: blocking roads and burning tires in the rural uprising in the Western Cape</td>
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Associational power: Example: the ability to form unions and influence government policy through political processes

Societal power: Example: Johannesburg municipal workers’ demonstrations and anti-corruption campaign


As Table 1 illustrates, it is possible to identify both new and traditional sources of power in contemporary protests.

I now turn to the ways in which workers are taking advantage of points of vulnerability within the present global order. There are a growing number of examples where globalisation has opened up new sources of power. For example, workers on the large grape farms in northeastern Brazil have been able to maintain high wages and permanent employment by taking advantage of the pressures on suppliers to deliver high-quality grapes on time for the European market (Selwyn, 2012). The exporters, large commercial farmers, are subject to quality pressures from retailers in Europe and need a permanent workforce that possesses the required skills. This has given the workers structural power – workplace bargaining power in the heart of the production process, not unlike the pressures of Fordist production – as well as marketplace bargaining power (their skills are needed by employers). But it is a new form of power in that workers are able to take advantage of capital’s vulnerability in the global production network. These previously low-wage farm workers can disrupt production if they are not satisfied with their working conditions, and employers cannot afford to allow this to happen given the strict delivery requirements from the retailers.

Below I look at three examples of this new-found workers’ power – the struggles of municipal workers in Johannesburg; the farm workers’ uprisings in 2012–2013 in the Western Cape; and the global campaign against Group 4 Securicor (G4S) led by the global union, Union Network International (UNI).

2. New Forms of Global Power

2.1 Municipal workers in Johannesburg

Among the struggles of municipal workers in Johannesburg, we can identify three cycles of contestation framed around the repertoires of inclusion and exclusion (Ludwig and Webster, 2014). The first cycle, 1980 to 1995, was framed against racial discrimination and the demand for inclusive, democratic citizenship. It culminated in 1995 in a brief honeymoon period and the promise of a participatory labour regime. The second cycle, 1996 to 2001, covers the shift to privatisation, when intense ideological contention focused around the opposition to privatisation, with workers demanding access to public goods. In the third cycle, 2001 to 2011, the union
– the South African Municipal Workers Union (SAMWU) – confronted the consequences of flexibilisation and the return of contract labour. The union responded to Pikitup, the private company contracted to run the municipality’s corporate strategy, by embarking on a campaign against corruption and demanding job security. This culminated in the 2011 strike against the quasi-private Pikitup (a waste collection company) that brought together casual and permanent workers in a successful demand for permanent jobs and an investigation into corruption.

We suggest that there is a shift from traditional sources of worker power to new forms of logistical and symbolic power. In the second and third cycles, framed in terms of anti-corruption and broader coalitions, SAMWU went beyond pressurising their Alliance1 partner, the African National Congress (ANC). They were able to gain public recognition through discourse power. Framing, therefore, relates to the generalisation of a grievance, shaping grievances into broader and more resonant claims (Tarrow, 2011: 31). For example, precarious workers can compensate for their lack of associational power ‘by drawing upon the contested arena of culture and public debates about values’ (Chun, 2009: 7), and by winning public recognition and legitimacy for workers’ struggles.

In entities like Pikitup, where the public is intensely affected by a strike, influencing public opinion plays an important role. Shop stewards believed that communities were sympathetic and in support of the strike because the union was blowing the whistle on corruption in Pikitup. However, these new sources of power remain embryonic and sporadic. SAMWU was not able to uphold its strategy of inclusive solidarity and social movement unionism because the union was torn between loyalty to its Alliance partner and support for social movements, fundamentally contesting neo-liberal politics.

At the same time power resources also depend on agency, on the unions’ mobilising capacity and on their strategic choices (Brinkmann et al., 2008, McGuire, 2012). As studies on social movements show, ‘material conditions do not necessarily and automatically generate mobilizing grievances’ (Levésque and Murray, 2013: 779). It is therefore necessary for actors to assign meaning to these conditions in order to transform grievances into mobilisation. The ‘repertoire of contention’, defined as ‘the ways people act together in pursuit of shared interests’ (Tilly, 1995: 41), can take three distinct forms of collective action– disruption, violence and contained behaviour – thereby combining to different degrees the properties of challenge, uncertainty and solidarity (Tarrow, 2011: 99).

2.2 Rural uprising at De Doorns

The De Doorns Uprisings in 2012–2013 were confrontational in nature. They included direct action through marching, blocking roads, collective refusal to go to work and the destruction of property. This challenged the dominant discourse of farm workers, namely, that the impediments to collective farm worker resistance results in workers relying on ‘weapons of the weak’ such as individual appeals and avoidance of open conflict within a paternalistic, moral universe. Andries du Toit argues that ‘... paternalism smothers any possibility of resistance’ (Du Toit, cited in Wilderman, 2014: 23). Paternalism, he argues, is reinforced by fear and isolation, farms are spread over long distances, and the strict enforcement of private property rights ‘means that the ability to gather any sort of strength or safety in numbers is very challenging’ (Du Toit, cited in Wilderman, 2014: 23).

1 The Tripartite Alliance has deep roots in the struggle for liberation in South Africa. In its current form it consists of the African National Congress, the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions. However, sections of COSATU have been very critical of the leadership of the Alliance for following what they see as orthodox neo-liberal economic and social policy.
Wilderman’s case study of the rural uprisings of 2012–2013 demonstrates this challenge to the conventional view by showing how the agricultural sector ‘is facing increasing global competition, decreased protection and subsidies from government, and the increasing power of consolidated buyers imposing greater demands in terms of lower costs and higher quality’ (Wilderman, 2014: 14). Farmers have responded, he suggests, by shifting away from live-on-farm labourers to the use of workers who live off-farm and are seasonal, casual or contract (migrant) labour. But this shift in the composition of the workforce is not only the result of ‘push factors’; there is also the ‘pull factor’ of an RDP house in the informal settlements, ‘creating the possibility of a more independent life for farm workers’ (Wilderman, 2014: 14).

The implications of this erosion of the workers’ paternalistic dependence on the farm owner through the socio-spatial shift to seasonal labourers living in informal settlements is, Wilderman argues, a contradictory one. On the one hand, seasonal employment in the context of a large reserve of labour adds to the vulnerability of workers; on the other hand, gathering together large numbers of workers with shared grievances in one place facilitates collective mass action, not just of farm workers. As a farm worker from De Doorns observed, it also included ‘taxi drivers, construction workers, security guards, teachers, nurses – the whole town shut down and every time we would march it would get bigger’ (Wilderman, 2014: 26).

Importantly, Wilderman explores how the strikes spread from the local level to the region. The accessibility of television and other media coverage of De Doorns, and two months earlier of Marikana, provided both a mechanism for disseminating the strike as well as a source of inspiration. But what turned this energy into collective action were the Coordinating Units, ‘locally based organisations or vanguard groups of pre-existing community based leadership’ (Wilderman, 2014: 45). A good example is the small socialist trade union, the Commercial, Stevedoring, Agricultural and Allied Workers Union (CSAAWU) based in Borrowdale, that had the capacity to turn energy and anger at the local level into a broad social base and link it to the larger movement. In addition, the tactics chosen – blocking roads, burning tires, marches, refusing to work, stopping others from working – were easily replicable without large resources. Materials such as petrol, tires, stones and hand-written placards were relatively easy for farm workers to acquire and did not require much coordination. The existence of information technology and social media ensured the rapid spread of the strike, and the coercive action of the police turned the strike into a human-rights-based discourse. It was, Wilderman concludes, the unplanned way in which the strike spread that made it ‘spontaneous’ (Wilderman, 2014: 30).

Wilderman concludes his study by raising the question of whether the Uprising has translated into the growth of existing or new organisations. At the level of formal trade union membership, there was an initial modest increase but it was short-lived. In part this was because there has been an intense employer backlash against farm workers, resulting in dismissals, evictions and refusal to rehire activists, as well as ‘stealing any sense of victory from the increased minimum wage by imposing greater deductions from pay checks … and a more rigid performance based piece rate system’ (Wilderman, 2014: 86). Furthermore, Wilderman argues, this was partially brought on by an ineffective approach to interaction and organisation during the protest, which built a sense of disillusionment and cynicism. In other words, the unions had attempted to mediate rather than to engage, empower and support farm workers.

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2 The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) was introduced shortly after the democratic transition. Among other benefits, it promised free or affordable housing for those previously denied it by the apartheid regime.
Wilderman’s study shows how the macro changes in agriculture have created a new kind of worker, no longer tied to the farm owner but easily mobilised in the densely populated informal settlements. However, although they are readily mobilised, this militant collective action has not translated into sustainable organisation.

2.3 The global campaign against G4S

A final example of the new forms of power emerging in the age of globalisation takes the actor-driven approach a step further by arguing that labour is an agent of global governance (McCallum, 2013). Workers, McCallum suggests, are not simply victims of the global juggernaut; they can change the rules of global engagement. Global Framework Agreements, he suggests, are part of this strategy to expand the bargaining power of national unions over entire industries by forcing major companies to play by union rules. McCallum illustrates this theoretical argument through an analysis of a global campaign led by the global union, Union Network International, against the multinational Group 4 Securicor, the largest employer in Africa and, surprisingly, also listed on the London Stock Exchange.

The campaign began in the United States with the Service Employee International Union (SEIU), an affiliate of UNI, and its successful Justice for Janitors Campaign. McCallum (2013) shows how the organisational model they developed was globalised and transferred to the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and then to Europe, and the Netherlands and Germany in particular.

In a nutshell, the model involved the relocation of resources towards new organising and an increased reliance on strategic research to drive the industrial strategy. The empirical core of McCallum’s book examines the extension of the campaign in 2008 to South Africa and India. McCallum argues that the campaign was successful because it neutralised the management of these enterprises while simultaneously creating the conditions for workers to organise, build new structures, renew old traditions and experiment with new strategies.

The centre of McCallum’s argument is that the campaign did not win new rights but instead used global power to make new rules of engagement for local unions. He calls this new approach ‘governance struggles’. Governance struggles refer, he says, ‘broadly to the exercise of power in the absence of an overarching political authority, usually by a constellation of institutions that make decisions and enforce compliance with norms and rules at the supranational level’ (McCallum, 2013: 12). This allows him to theorise global unions themselves as potential agents of governance. In South Africa this meant, for example, that for every thousand union members, the union was entitled to one full-time shop steward. It now has four nation-wide.

McCallum has identified a new source of power, global power. This is an important insight, as it allows us to go beyond the widespread view that globalisation disables labour – the pessimistic school – to begin to explore the new sources of vulnerability and the strategic possibilities that globalisation has created for labour. This case study raises four issues: what is new in the new labour internationalism; old and new sources of worker power; union democracy and the bureaucratisation of shop stewards; and the limits of transferring union models to other countries.

Firstly, there is an ambiguity in the question of how ‘new’ the new governance struggles are. As McCallum (2013) acknowledges, Charles Levinson from International Chemical, Energy and Mining (ICEM), a global trade union secretariat, argued for what he called company councils in the early seventies – that is, worker committees extending across countries in multinational
companies. In South Africa, the emerging black unions targeted transnational corporations and entered into what were called ‘recognition agreements’ at plant level that established new rules on the shop floor enabling the unions to gain access to the workplace. These are examples of governance struggles where unions were agents filling the ‘governance gap’ in a context where the rights of black workers were not recognised. These agreements relied on navigating between the local and the global – that is, between local workplace resistance and the global sanctions campaign of the anti-apartheid movement. But this combination of the local and the global was driven overwhelmingly by the power of local union organisation, as Seidman (2009) has pointed out in her comparative study of codes of conduct.

Secondly, is it possible to sustain engagement in these ‘new rules’ through associational power alone? Put differently, is associational power sustainable without institutional power? To be sustainable, these new rules need to be consolidated. Can they be consolidated without institutions to enforce them? For example, McCallum (2013: 29) writes: ‘In South Africa, guards used the agreement to demand access rights. Once organizers were able to talk to workers without fear of management reprisal, organizing exploded.’ I would argue that rules on their own are not lasting unless they are supported by institutional power. It is institutions that create new ‘rules of the game’. Without the sanctions that go with new rules, local management has not really changed in G4S in South Africa. Indeed, it required the state-funded Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) to facilitate the establishment of an industry-wide National Bargaining Forum in 2009 to ensure a successful three-year wage agreement (Sefalafala and Webster, 2013).

Thirdly, the outcome of the governance struggles, the creation of four full-time shop stewards in G4S, is what Sakhela Buhlungu (2010) has called the ‘paradox of victory’. On the one hand, having elected shop stewards paid by management and able to work full-time on union business is a major gain for workers. On the other hand, these shop stewards have increasingly come under attack within the labour movement for being too close to management. As full-time shop stewards they are entitled to a range of privileges that has often distanced them from the shop floor. By focusing on one multinational in a context where only 16 per cent of the industry is organised, has the campaign not entrenched union leaders at G4S as a union bureaucracy amid a majority of low-wage, precarious workers (Sefalafala and Webster, 2013)?

Fourthly, McCallum (2013) argues convincingly that the US organising model is growing in influence globally. As he notes, this is ironic given the experience of many European, African and Asian trade unions of the legacy of US trade union imperialism. The sentiment is captured in this comment by a European trade unionist: ‘If the IMF [International Monetary Fund] had a trade union wing, it would do what the SEIU does. It’s weird, but in a way those people [SEIU leaders] are our role models, but they are also a huge pain in the ass’ (cited in McCallum, 2013: 150).

The globalisation of the US model is ironic for another reason. I have argued earlier that innovative union organising linking the workplace to the community in the eighties in countries of the South was circulating in the opposite direction from South to North (Ligsig-Mumme and Webster, 2012). More recently, Ercu Celik (2014) has shown how the concept of social movement unionism, used in South Africa, Brazil and the Philippines in the eighties, travelled North to the United States mediated through Northern scholars, a case, he suggests, of learning from the periphery. Importantly, both authors stress the differences of social context between the Global South and Global North, reminding scholars of the dangers of transferring union models.
3. Conclusion: Institutional Power – The Neglected Dimension

Our identification of sources of power is incomplete without an account of institutional power and strategic capabilities. Institutional power embeds past social compromises by the incorporation of associational and structural power into institutions (Dörre, Holst and Nachtwey, 2009). As McGuire argues, this source of power continues to be applied during ongoing economic cycles, even where power relations within society may have changed. It may take the form of labour law, wage setting and bargaining arrangements, as well as institutionalised forms of social dialogue such as the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), South Africa’s premier peak level social dialogue institution (McGuire, 2012: 43). The important point about institutional power is that it grants rights but also limits the space for action (Dorre et al., 2009). The Jena power resources approach argues that institutions shape the relationship between structural and associational /organisational power, but that power resources are not sufficient; they need strategic capabilities – that is, the capability to detect power resources in order to make use of them as well as the organisational flexibility to optimise associational power (Dörre et al., 2009). This is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The pyramid of workers’ power resources

In this paper I have identified the new sources of power that are emerging in the age of globalisation. If it is premature to call these forms of action a counter-movement, they have nevertheless shaken up our research agenda and challenged us to rethink the relationship between global capital, global labour, and the new forms of action and social movements that are emerging at the periphery of the traditional labour movement. This emerging research agenda will require a multi-level analysis if it is to contribute to renewing the labour movement.

The four-fold sources of power – structural, associational, societal and institutional – provide the basis for a strategy of union renewal. It is worth noting the pessimism that faced the labour movement in the thirties in the United States. As labour historian David Brody has argued (Brody, 1980, cited in Cobble, 1992: 82):

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3 Donna McGuire (2012) develops the notion that institutional power is a neglected dimension of power in her doctoral thesis at the University of Kassel.
Perhaps one of the more famous stories illustrating the labor movement’s unpredictable course is the one historians often tell of multitude and solemn pronouncements made by august labor scholars in 1932 heralding the certain death of the American labor movement. These dire predictions, of course, were issued literally on the eve of the dramatic and widespread upsurge of labor organizing that began in 1932.

The development of capitalism is a contradictory process; in each phase of its development it faces obstacles to the accumulation process and, in overcoming these obstacles, generates new opportunities for collective worker action and organisation. The rise of factory-based production overcame the limits of home-based production, but in the process created the conditions for the emergence of trade unions. The rise of Fordism led to a shift from craft unionism – where the power of the workers lay in their skill (market-based power) to industrial unionism, where worker power lay in a new political subject – the semi-skilled worker, whose new source of power was workplace bargaining (Webster, 1985).

Neo-liberal globalisation and the information technology that accompanied it has increased productivity to unprecedented levels worldwide, overcoming the impediments to capital that arose from militant industrial unions. However, globalisation has opened up a new sources of power and opportunities for transnational action and organisation on a global scale (Evans, 2010).
References


