

“What Happens in the Greenzone, stays in the Greenzone”: 2010 Safety and Security as a Marketing Strategy by Christopher McMichael

The FIFA Soccer World Cup in Africa is a love story and I am happy that this love story is coming together and is becoming a real wedding party. Africans have waited for a very long time; the dream is now a reality¹ - Joseph Blatter

The future...is a cocktail of these elements: the ennui of edge land architecture, airport roads the same everywhere, and highly visible-tanks patrolling the perimeter fence. If an English team ventures to Pakistan it will be accorded, so the relevant diplomat assures us, the highest level of security; ‘‘ head of state.’’ That is to say, public roads in Karachi will be entirely cleared between five-star hotel and stadium. The city of the spectacle is deserted, crowds under curfew, so that the sport of the people can be performed, at a time suitable to the television networks, in a massively guarded redoubt² - Iain Sinclair

What is the robbing of a bank, compared to its founding?³ - Bertolt Brecht



1: Mission Accomplished

After six years of planning the 2010 World Cup has come and gone. All that is left are the memories and images that will be replayed in “Proudly South African” type adverts in

¹. 03/03/2010, Blatter- 2010 is a love story, www.sa2010.gov.za/en/node/2868

². Sinclair, I, 14/07/2005, Theatre of the City, The Guardian

³. Brecht, B, 1966, The Threepenny Opera, in Plays, London, Meuthuen.

perpetuity. The event was a huge success and much of this was linked to the manner in which it confounded the criticisms that were skeptical, if not overtly hostile to “Africa’s turn.” As President Zuma noted at his post- World Cup address to the country:

“It is truly an emotional moment for a nation that has doomsayers warning football fans to avoid coming to South Africa. The world has been told to expect high levels of crime, unfinished stadiums and other infrastructure as well as a lack of accommodation. They came and discovered that we are a winning nation of very humble, hospitable people. They learned too that we are very efficient organizers and planners. We did it, we did it well, we did it successfully, but we did not do it alone. We did it with Africa and with the support of the world. Today we are so happy to be able to say thank you to everyone who made this glorious African moment possible.”⁴

The President also praised South African citizens, foreign fans and teams, with this largesse extending even to the Vuvuzela and Paul the Octopus, the celaphodic seer of the tournament. Particular attention was paid to the “the security establishment for proving to the world that we mean business when it comes to maintaining law and order”.⁵ Crucially however, the first body which Zuma thanked in his speech was not the public servants and volunteers, nor the public at large but rather the institution which effectively owns international football, and of course, the tournament itself:

“We thank FIFA, under the leadership of President Sepp Blatter, for the confidence shown in our country and people over the last six years. Our hosting of the historic first FIFA World Cup on African soil indicates Mr Blatter’s strong conviction that we were capable of delivering a spectacular and successful event.”⁶

In his own post- World Cup address, Blatter congratulated South Africa as an example of achievement to the rest of the continent, and also stressed that judged against FIFA’s

⁴ RSA The Presidency, 12/07/10 SA: Zuma: Address by the President of South Africa, marking the end of the 2010 FIFA World Cup.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Ibid

stringent hosting requirements the tournament was as close to perfection as can be achieved in this world :

“Today is the day after match 64 was played in the FIFA World Cup that was played for the first time on African soil, specifically in the Republic of South Africa. I gave South Africa seven and a half out of 10 after last year’s Confederations Cup and I now give the country nine out of 10 for organizing a successful World Cup..... You have shown the world that you can achieve anything and its time now to that you show the rest of Africa that it can achieve anything.... there were many pessimists in the beginning but I always said that it is a question of trust and confidence and we trusted South Africa and they have delivered..... Big compliments to South Africa and to the people of this country. Also, big compliments to the South African government for meeting all the guarantees they made for the successful organization of the World Cup. South Africa has not only managed to stage an incident free world cup, it has left a good impression to the people of the world and you can be proud of that. *The compliments should go to you not to FIFA*”

⁷.(my italics)

Contained within these statements we can see the outline of the post-World Cup narrative: defying all the naysayers and doom mongers, the South African state, backed up by the patriotic fervor of the private sector and a unified populace had defied all expectations. Not only were all its bid requirements met on time, but the event itself was incident free. Not only was South Africa able to present itself in a new vein of optimism, confounding predictions of chaos and disrepair, but it may have also initiated a world historical shift: rebranding the entire subcontinent through an assertive projection of a competent, managerial African state. An underlying subnarrative in this is the role of FIFA itself. As alluded to in both Zuma’s and Blatter’s speeches, the organization is presented as a kind of philanthropic, almost missionary organization. Its awarding of the World Cup to an African country was driven not purely by logistical, commercial and rotational concerns but rather is animated with the pure “Geist” of rebranding fervour: the dream of African assertion is a shared one. Sepp Blatter stands as the embodiment of

⁷ allAfrica.com. South Africa: Country an Example for Africa- Blatter, 12/ 07/10

this, his visionary and brave support of the South African bid showing prescience worthy of Paul the Octopus.

A crucial component of this strategy, and perhaps the most important was the role of the State security services. City of Cape Town official Richard Bosman, who co-ordinated the Western Cape Security stream admits that the 2010 preparations were essentially a trial by media: ‘’ we consistently looked at what the media were saying, and aimed to change some of these negative perceptions’’.⁸ So when cities approached their planning the primary concern was *visual*: “Security is not just about crime, it also about ensuring that our streets are clean. Service delivery is also a part of our security planning.”⁹ To take the visual analogy further, we can also argue that this is aimed at both an *internal* and an *external* audience. In terms of the external audience there are three primary tiers: FIFA, foreign visitors and the global media. Firstly, as signatory to the host agreements the South African government was expected to meet a wide-ranging set of security considerations. These legal arrangements form the security architecture of the tournament and are not country specific; rather they are determined by so called ‘ international best practice.’ Closely linked to these agreements is the state’s legal responsibility to protect foreign visitors (FIFA has total legal immunity for any cases arising out of the 2010 World Cup). This included special planning for the safety of VIPS, teams and officials through special measures such as the creation of virtual borders around hotels and training grounds. Ordinary tourists were also extended a unique degree of protection: special police units were sent to patrol fan parks and other popular tourist destinations. This was aided by contingents of police and security officials from other countries such as INTERPOL and the US Special Forces. It is also important to note that this policing was meant to be visible, but not too visible. In other words, tourists were meant to feel safe while not feeling exposed to an overbearing police presence. As Bheki Cele puts it while police were prepared to meet all contingencies; “As security agents we must behave in a way that that ensures a peaceful time for entertainment and enjoyment that

⁸ Personal correspondence, 20/07/10

⁹ Ibid

visitors enjoy to the maximum’’.¹⁰ Crucially, this was aimed at dispelling the stereotypes of South Africa as a kind of hellish zone of criminality and chaos. The lead up to the event saw reams of sensationalist media reporting from the now infamous MACHETE RACE WAR headlines to bizarre reports about snake infested stadia. The main concern was with preventing any kind of events which may add credence to these reports. Any kind of negative reporting would have been disastrous in PR terms, which of course would have been even further intensified by the speed of information diffusion in the modern world. For instance, this was the first World Cup which was reported on Twitter.

This assertion of state power also has an *internal* cachet. Inasmuch as the SAPS are the trump card in South Africa’s rebranding, the institution is itself engaged in a PR campaign. This is aimed at assuring South Africa’s citizens that their police are an effective, streamlined weapon in the ‘war against crime’. This has been expressed in a variety of ways. At the level of rhetoric, a bellicose commitment to hunting down ‘evil’ criminals has been deployed over the last two years. This has also been accompanied by an expressed commitment to punishing corruption within the force itself with harshest punitive measures. In particular, there has been a move to dispel the stereotype of police officers as inefficient ‘timeservers.’ To this end, a militarized ranking system has been introduced. This has also taken place at an aesthetic level with the introduction of black, paramilitary style uniforms and the sophisticated equipment purchased as part of the allocated World Cup spending. As with other areas of the tournament funding, purchasing has been justified in terms of the legacy it will leave. And there is no doubt that World Cup and the rebranding of the security forces has been mutually reinforcing: the tournament served as a kind of debutante’s ball for the new look SAPS. At Soccer City, on the morning of the final match, Cele addressed rows of heavily armed officers and soldiers, their new riot shields and body armour gleaming in the sun.¹¹ In his address he stressed that while the specific mobilization required for the World Cup had come to an end, the professionalism and assertive policing that was on display is a mark of things to come.

¹⁰ Interview with Bheki Cele, March 2010, FIFA Magazine,

¹¹ SABC, 19/0710, When Duty Calls.

This is a collaborative effort which cuts across various government departments. The primary locus for the execution of security plans was the SAPS, aided by the SANDF, the SAF and the NIA. But this effort required co-ordination with a variety of institutions: the Health Department for emergency planning, the Department of Foreign Affairs for tracking of undesirables and so on. One contentious issue has been the issue of private sector involvement: the SAPF has been quick to deny the involvement of various security firms who have claimed to be providing different levels of support in the media. In the lead up to the tournament they continued to stress that official security was more than adequate and that tourists did not need to pay for personal protection services. *The success of the security planning is very much regarded as a state initiative, and a state success.*

And as we now know, the tournament was a security success. Contrary to the lurid images of armies of hijackers waiting to prey on defenceless tourists the actual incidents of crime were relatively minor. By June 29th 316 persons had been arrested for a variety of offences: 207 were South African citizens and 109 were foreign nationals with the majority of cases pertaining to petty theft.¹² The most high profile of these was a Magaliesburg armed robbery case, where Portuguese and Spanish journalists were robbed in their hotels by armed gunmen. As with the other cases, the alleged perpetrators were arrested and sentenced in the special dedicated World Cup courts in a matter of days. What became quite clear as the tournament progressed was that in many ways this was a security non-event. Even the most high profile cases were almost farcical. Take the Simon Wright case in which it was alleged that the British tabloid journalist had aided a fan with gaining entry into the Green Point Stadium as a means of exposing flaws in the security protocol. To return to our concept of ‘‘ media war’’ this was a clear instance of sensationalist reporting in which there was an attempt to fabricate an incident. Perhaps showing their new concern with PR, the SAPS have been adamant about making an example of Wright. Even the supposed *bete noire* of sporting mega events, spectacular

¹² www.saps.gov.za, 29/06/10, Text of the Police Commissioners Report on World Cup Security

terrorism, did not rear its head. Other than the arrest of two Pakistani nationals, who had no links to terror networks, the only incident was the tragic bomb attack in Uganda which had nothing to do with South Africa. Not only did the SAPS fulfill all its mandates, it also went beyond them. Most notably, the SAPS took over stadium security duties, after a wage dispute with a FIFA outsourced company saw private security guards on strike.

After this success, many of the dire pre-tournament predictions of a security nightmare seem quaint and hyperbolic. The South African press was quick to promote sensationalist reporting in the months before kick off. Some of the most prominent ‘dreadful warnings’ included E-TV’s coverage of criminal preparations for 2010 and ‘The Sunday Times’ claims about imminent terrorist atrocities. The underlying theme was the state’s lack of readiness. However the combination of large scale state planning and the patriotic fervour around the tournament saw these kinds of stories quickly disappear. We can see a shift from one kind of common sense doxa to another. Before the tournament there was a focus on the ominous threats which loomed over the event and the state’s inability to cope with all these. During the tournament this was recodified into the belief that the preparations had made the country safer. Now the state is being urged to replicate these lessons so that the World Cup is not merely an anomaly. Even writer Rian Malan, whose journalistic stock in trade is depictions of South African decrepitude and failure noted that:

“the hoods who pulled guns on those Mexican journalists for instance, were rounded up and sentenced within 72 hours- a level of efficiency last seen in the darkest days of apartheid, when police routinely used torture to extract confessions. Human rights types whined, but the government was extremely pleased with itself.”¹³

The historically suspect definition of ‘efficiency’ aside, the fact that such a committed ‘Afro- pessimist’ is excited about the success of the arrangements is telling. The apocalyptic predictions have melted away like fragments of a dissolving nightmare, owing to the relative absence of serious crime. Ordinary South Africans should feel grateful about the benefits of the World Cup and should pressure their security services in

¹³. Malan, R, 03/0710, South African Police 1, Machete-wielding Mobs 0, The Telegraph

to maintaining fidelity to this event mobilization. But if the pre doom-mongering orthodoxy was a chimera, why are we to assume that the new reading of 2010 will be different?



2: Writing the World Cup

For example, the notion that the safety and security arrangements were mobilized primarily for the benefit of the South African state is problematic. As a World Cup host, the South African state was obliged to protect the marketing and investment rights of both FIFA and its multinational partners. As part of the bidding process, the South African bid committee had to draft a Bid Book which detailed the state's ability to meet all necessary FIFA requirements. In this sense, the Bid Book forms the mitochondrial plan for all the security plans we saw over the last month. This included guarantees of specialized protection of all sites where FIFA accredited persons were present (stadiums,

training grounds, hotels, etc).¹⁴ All security plans made by the state were submitted to FIFA for approval.¹⁵ Furthermore, FIFA was guaranteed total legal indemnity: all proceedings and resulting legal cost stemming from the World Cup are a government responsibility.¹⁶

As an organization, FIFA's main responsibility is to protect the interests of both itself and its corporate backers. FIFA is the owner of one of the most lucrative advertising commodities in the world: the Soccer World Cup. It sells different levels of marketing rights to capital based on their level of sponsorship. There are six tiers. For example the top tier of 'FIFA partners' includes Adidas, Coca-Cola, Emirates Airline, and Hyundai. Sony and Visa, which are granted exclusive marketing rights, such as having their corporate logos appear on TV screens as background to the score line during matches. All six tiers share a common interest with aggressively protecting their marketing rights from so called 'ambush marketing'. To this end, the state instituted a legislative framework to protect FIFA. This included the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Act and an amendment to the 1976 Trade Practices Act. In addition, under South African marketing law, the World Cup was designated as a protected event. These were more than just a courtesy on the part of the state. Special SAPS units were set up to track down ambush marketing, and some of these police operated as plain clothes units in fan parks, stadia and the surrounding precincts. The arrest of 36 Dutch supporters for alleged ambush marketing highlights this: they were taken out of the stadium by stewards before being handed over to the SAPS to face charges which could have lead to six months imprisonment. Klauser argues that commercial partners are concerned about event security as a way of maintaining that the image of a safe and fun World Cup for marketing purposes is ensured.¹⁷ As we can see with this World Cup, the alliance goes even further as business uses the punitive mechanisms of the state to aggressively pursue its own interests. One of the most revelatory features of the Bid Book is that the

¹⁴ SAFA, 2003, South Africa Bid 2010: Africa's Stage, section, 4/5

¹⁵ Ibid

¹⁶ SAFA, 4.15

¹⁷ Klauser, F, 2007, FIFA Land TM: Alliances between security politics and business interests for Germany's city network, Conference lectured at the Symposium "Architectures of fear. Terrorismo and the Future of Urbanism in the West" CCCB 17-18 May 2007

prevention of ambush marketing warrants as much attention as other threats such as crowd violence and terror attacks.

This level of corporate domination may tempt us into seeing the World Cup as a kind of occupation. While this analogy of occupation may be tempting on a metaphorical level (the stadiums as the Baghdad Greenzone, the SAPS as a collaborationist militia, etc) it fails to address the question of state agency. Rather than being the end victims of a kind of Faustian pact, the state aggressively courted FIFA and was party to all its demands. Essentially, FIFA is a parasite on the state, unable to exert any real material power of its own. Much of the academic literature on 2010 has failed to internalize this fact and instead has treated the state as a kind of conceptual ‘‘black box’’ whose role is assumed, rather than discussed and analyzed.¹⁸ Essentially the state is treated as kind of villain: either in its failure to meet FIFA criteria or in its perceived inability to exercise centralizing power over the body. As Mbembe argues this is reflective of a focus on instrumentalism: i.e. how much does the World Cup cost, do we have the capacity to host it and so on.¹⁹ This has been a tendency which has been exhibited in much of the available literature and which, in my opinion has failed to look at how the tournament provides a catalyst for revealing the ideas and political rationalities which the event brings to light. We can identify two tendencies: firstly a focus on the organizational logistics of the event and secondly a more critical tendency which argues that the event is primarily a capitalist jamboree which fails to leverage socioeconomic justice. The first tendency has been especially prevalent in the small body of literature which has focused on the safety and security arrangements. The majority of this has come from think tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies and the South African Institute of Race Relations. Johan Burger from the ISS has produced several papers on the subject with an exclusive focus on describing the state and nature of police preparations.²⁰ Far less

¹⁸. Tombs, S and Whyte, D, 2009. The State and Corporate Crime. In: Coleman, R ed, State Power Crime. London: Sage.

¹⁹. Mbembe, A, 31/10/2006, 2010 Soccer World Cup: Where Is the Moral Argument, *Africultures*

²⁰. See for example Burger, J, 01/03/07, A Golden Goal for South Africa: The Security Arrangements for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, *Crime Quarterly* 19.

temperate has been Frans Cronje from the SAIRR, who wrote several articles detailing the alleged threat posed by Al-Queda.²¹ Although there is a divergence on the question of how adequate security planning was, the overall focus has been on a technocratic description of security, which often entails an unquestioning acceptance of discourses such as the “war on terror” as unquestioned fact. Nor is there consideration of the possible implication of the police mobilization and the new forms of social control which it may engender. In particular, aggressive policing is treated as an *a priori* good.

So far, the most substantive academic publication on the World Cup has been ‘Development and Dreams: The Urban legacy of the 2010 World Cup’ which applies international research on the socioeconomic impacts of sporting mega-events to the South African context.²² While this edited volume gives us insights into the planning and seems to have enjoyed a high level of access to government officials, its instrumentalist focus leads it to conclude that the material benefits of the tournament are invariably overstated. But rather than questioning the impact of this fact, or coming out and acknowledging that there is a strong element of hucksterism in the claims used to justify World Cup spending, it falls back on the claim that this will be offset by intangible benefits. And so again, we can see an avoidance of the key political questions raised by 2010, such as the role of the state and ideology.

A fairly transparent fact is that despite the rhetoric, the 2010 World Cup is in no way designed as a poverty upliftment scheme which has lead many on the left to critique the event. Again, this is done from an instrumentalist point of view: spending that could have been used to address far worthier and urgent social goals has been sunk into turning

²¹ . See for example, Cronje, F, 14/01/2010, Could Al-Queda Attack the World Cup, SAIRR Newsletter.

²² . Pillay, U, Tomlinson, R, and Bass, O. 2009. *Development and dreams: The urban legacy of the 2010 football world cup*. Cape Town: HSRC Press.

South African cities into theme parks for capital.²³ What is often invoked is the harsh disparities in South African society: to give a common visual trope, unserviced shacks are a few kilometers away from new stadia. This leveraging of funds is seen as proof of the state's slavish commitment to neoliberal orthodoxy: slashing public funds for an elite project, sacrificing its own sovereignty to corporate power etc. The state is both villain and victim, as it colludes in its own underdevelopment and peripheral place in the global political economy.²⁴ The concerns this raises may be morally unimpeachable because there is something reprehensible about this in a country where millions live in the direst poverty. But it also prey to some glaring inconsistencies. If we chose the view of South Africa as kind of authoritarian market state, then critiquing its wastage of public money ignores the very terms of the critique. Neoliberalism entails that in wealth is in practice redistributed upwards and the concept of trickle down benefits is fundamentally an ideological form of social control. De-crying the market state for its failure to achieve wealth redistribution is somewhat disingenuous. It is also a limited form of critique: for instance, journalist David Bullard, whose projects seems to be to chastise the South African state for *not* conforming to the ideal of the liberal market state is also able to attack the World Cup for not delivering benefits for the poor.²⁵ Rather than showing a beneficent consensus, this may show the limits of the instrumentalist cost-benefit analysis. As Imraan Buccus, noted in response to a column of mine which exhibited many of the features aforementioned it may also run the danger of kind of condescending vanguardism which ignores the genuine popular energies which accompanied the tournament.²⁶ The fact is that that was a genuine sense of national achievement. Perhaps most significantly, there was the projection internationally of a competent African modernity. Certainly, this patriotic fervor did fit into the contours of capitalist spectacle. We only have to look at the way in which the carnivalques atmosphere all across the country seemed to be neatly prefigured by relentless advertising. But the feeling of achievement should not be written off a platitudinous and affirmationist 'common sense'.

²³. McMichael, C, 10/06/2010, Questioning the Wisdom of Corporate Theme Parks for Citizens, The Mercury. The Centre for Civil Society at UKZN also maintains a very useful archive of '' anti-World Cup'' literature.

²⁴ Desai, A and Vahed, G, 2010, 2010 World Cup; Africa's Turn or Turning on Africa: A Political Economy of FIFA's African Adventure, Soccer and Society, Volume 11, Issue 1 and 2.


²⁵ . Bullard, D, 26/05/2010, Not With a Bang, but With a Whimper, Politicsweb,

²⁶. Buccus, I, 16/06/2010, Remember the youth during the World Cup, The Mercury

Left critiques have failed to see the significance of this 'rebranding' and have tended to treat it with a certain degree of distaste. The crucial facet about this World Cup for my research is how the security services were a key component for a marketing regime. This was as much about promoting South Africa TM as it was about ensuring the interests of the FIFA complex. What was being asserted was a conception of South Africa, and to some extent the continent: gentrified, assertive, *ready to do business*. A telling incident involving academics associated with the Centre for Civil Society at the Durban fan park shows something of the nature of this. After attempting to hand out flyers promoting a march against xenophobia, they were arrested and interrogated by the SAPS. Certainly this was an abuse of freedom of speech, but the behavior of the police was more than just about corporate authoritarianism and a denial of unpleasant social reality. The fan parks are designed as benevolent examples of corporate philanthropy. A reminder of the dark side of South African nationalism is an intrusion into this amnesiac flow. It presents an image of South Africa which marketing not only denied but tried to counter pose as being irrelevant. The fan parks provide an example in miniature of the theme park South Africa which the event aimed at selling.

What needs to be further interrogated is the question of how the state markets and advertises itself, which as Black and Van der Westhuizen argue has been hardly recognized as form of political power.²⁷ Rather than being sophistries, they are fictions which actively represent some of the ruling political *modes* of our age.

²⁷ Black, D, and Van Der Westhuizen, J, 2004, The Allure of Global Games for 'semi-peripheral' Politics and Spaces: a Research agenda, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No.7:pp.1195-1214



3: Fictions of Every kind

My main focus in this section will be to highlight how the *marketing* and *aestheticization* of the 2010 safety and security arrangements can highlight modes of political power. The study of mega-event security planning has become a growing transdisciplinary field. In terms of the discursive perspective, the focus has been on critical urban geography.²⁸ This attempts to contextualize security strategies within the context of new forms of consumption, new technologies of social control and the militarization of the urban environment. We can say that this includes a *spatial* focus. While this approach has much to teach us, I have found it problematic in my own work for two reasons. Firstly, there is one of methodological practicality. To put it frankly, my attempts to record the spatial trajectories of the World Cup have proved problematic because of a lack of access to the security forces. The second is a question of disciplinary focus, and the need to maintain a political-theoretical focus on the state rather than some badly thought out pseudo-mix of Geography and Sociology. Lefebvre cautions us about confusing the fictional space of literature with the concrete reality of lived social spaces.²⁹ Cautioning against an inconsistent usage of space, he distinguishes between discursive space and material space: The former can lead to a discourse on space but cannot give concrete knowledge of this space. However, this is not an impermeable relationship: material space is capable “of preempting the production of new spaces, such as those found in Utopia and Science Fiction.”³⁰ This porous relationship can also move in the opposite direction: We can think here of how the “imaginative geography” of Orientalism has structured geopolitics in the last decade.³¹ This notion of countering imaginative geographies is critical to role of the state in 2010. In particular, there has been a focus on offering a purgative to the idea of ‘feral cities’³²: South African cities as lurid Hobbesian factories of despair, death and depravity. If we look at advertising as a kind of fiction (perhaps as the science fiction

²⁸. Giulianotti, R. and Klauser, F. R. (2010) 'Security governance and sport mega-events : toward an interdisciplinary research agenda.', *Journal of sport and social issues.*, 34

²⁹. Lefebvre, H, 1994, *The Production of Space*, Oxford and Cambridge, Blackwell.

³⁰. Ostrowidzki, E, 2009, *Utopia's of the New Right* in J.G. Ballard's Fiction, *Space and Culture*, vol.12, no.1.

³¹. Gregory, D, 2004, *The Colonial Present*, Oxford, Blackwell.

³². Manaugh, G, September-October 2009, *Cities Gone Wild*, *Architectural Design*.

of capitalism) then we can see how the materiality of the security arrangements serves as a counter to a series of discursive claims: a dialectical osmosis. In other words, the security arrangements have at once a *practical* and *aesthetic* component. This is closely linked to the combination of permissiveness and social control. The security services are meant to play the role of unobtrusive supporters of consumption but they are also their as a visible reassurance of the presence of state power. Following Žizek, this is reflective of today's predominant mode of politics, *post-political biopolitics*.³³

Post-political entails the idea that the ideological struggles of the last few centuries have been resolved and that the function of the state is merely administrative and managerial. Central to this is the notion that economics can be severed from politics and that the role of the state is to provide a base for capitalist development. The form of management may differ, from liberal democracy to the Chinese model, but the fundamentals are still the same. Mega-events form a crucial part of this, as they are seen as a form of place marketing which leads to investment. This provides a legitimation for the power relationship that we see in the World Cup, where FIFA is able to outsource the state security services. Rather than being an attack on its sovereignty, this is seen as part of the 'proper functioning' of the state. Indeed, newspaper letter columns during the World Cup were full of paeans to the kind of achievements that the state can make when pressurized by capital: the Stakhanovite set of FIFA demanded targets as a model for the future. At the same time the state internalizes this 'business ontology',³⁴ in which an idealized version of business becomes the arbiter of the state's actions. As a result, one of the key aspirations of the state is to brand and market itself. For instance, a successful security mobilization shows its ability to deliver the commodity of safety. The state becomes one of a number of brands in the advertising constellation. Although the state has to provide the material basis for the World Cup, it also has to share space. For example, whenever the president modeled the Bafana Bafana shirt he was also giving coverage to ADIDAS. Crucial to this notion of post-politics is the marketing of 'world class cities': which are

³³ Žizek, S, 2008, *Violence*, New York, Picador.

³⁴ Fisher, M, 2009, *Capitalist Realism*, London, Zero Books.

unique enough to have a special cachet while still being homogenous enough to offer the required kinds of airports, hotels, shopping malls and business parks.

Central to this idea of the state as ‘lifestyle enabler’ is the state as a *biopolitical* manager. Although biopolitics has a range of meanings, I use it to refer to Agamben’s notion of *the state as the regulator of the safety of human lives*. This is crucial to an understanding of the role of the state security forces. The World Cup entailed a de facto, albeit subtle, state of emergency. The security plans divided South Africa into a series of zones, with special protection reserved for those zones considered critical to the World Cup. This security architecture was also ‘vertical’³⁵ in that airspace was also a part of the regime. Nor was this confined to land: as the South African navy was also mobilized. Central to this is the biopolitical protection of the ‘consumer subject.’³⁶ But why such a mobilization of state force is necessary to protect what is after all a sporting tournament? Partly this is due to the perceived globalization of risks such as terrorism and hooliganism, and the parallel risk prevention norms. This takes a ‘one size fits all approach’ in which risks are assumed to be global. For example, the World Cup preparations included measures against car bomb attacks even though these are not a phenomenon in South Africa. It also highlights the manner in which the modern state exerts symbolic power through the display of punitive force. The states legitimacy is dependent on its ability to mobilise against the entire modern demonology of threats from dirty bombs to pandemics.

The notion of a *post-political biopolitics* is fraught with internal contradiction. On the one hand you have the confident assertion of the end of ideological struggle and the creation of a global order. However, this is threatened by the generation of new and terrifying risks from the ‘atavistic’, such as religious extremism, to the futuristic, such as the uncontrolled proliferation of chemical, genetic and nuclear weapons. Despite the seeming enormity of these threats, they can somehow be contained and defeated through the

³⁵ Weizman, E, 2002, The Politics of Verticality, www.Opendemocracy.net.

³⁶ Lemke, M, 2001. The birth of bio-politics: Michael Foucault’s lectures at the College de France on neo-liberal governmentality. *Economy and Society*, 30(2).

application of managerial and technological power. This kind of incoherent combination of nightmare and utopia shows that the very notion of the post-political state is in itself ideological. And many of the ideas that underpin this have been proven to be patently false. For example the notion of the market as an automatic corrective to social and economic problems has been made untenable by the 2008 bank bail-outs. This also applies to of the state as 'security manager' which is in itself conditioned by specific ideologies rather than some apolitical science of risk management. There is no better example of this the whole sale importation of the 'war on terror' into security planning with its attendant parade of "Islamist phantoms".³⁷ The hyperbolic and often racist claims about 'terrorists' threats to the World Cup are reflective of how a specific political project has been cut and pasted into the script of state power.

4) Conclusions and further questions

It is my contention that the usage of security planning as a kind of advertising campaign is central to our understanding of the 2010 World Cup. The kind of imaginative geographies which this sells are worthy of serious study. However, this does not mean that they should be treated uncritically. Rather they are representative of a reality system which is the result of material, historical and class struggles. The very concept of 'rational mega-event management' is an expression of political and economic powers to which we are subordinated.

The objective fact is that the World Cup saw the extortion of public money for the benefit of capital, and it is ordinary South Africans who will have to pay the costs of this. Past experience shows that the stadia of which we are supposed to be so proud may someday become dilapidated debt traps. Perhaps what was most disturbing about the pornographic greed exhibited by FIFA was that it was justified in the name of 'development' and upliftment. FIFA is currently involved in the self-congratulatory philanthropy of the 1Goal campaign which (allegedly) aims to provide education to 75 Million African children. Perhaps more headway could be made on this worthy cause if the South African

³⁷. Curtis, A, 30/08/2005, Creating Islamist Phantoms, The Guardian.

state was to receive a repayment on their \$ 3 billion loan to the Zurich soccer Tsars. But this is not just a South African aberration. As I speak a similar process is taking place around the London 2012 Olympics and the 2016 Brazilian World Cup. If I may be factious, the South African state has shown that it can also be a 'World Class' competitor in its race to the bottom. The question is what leads states to participate in this: Is it the product of an elite consensus, a product of genuine belief or simply a sense that there is no alternative? The relationship between the South African state and FIFA is a perfect reflection of the situation after thirty years of dominant 'capitalist realism'. It is not an example of so called crony or mafia capitalism. It is the direct product of 'legitimate' political and economic practice where state and corporate power are merged in the name of development and security. As the state has become less powerful in economic spheres, it has increased its powers of political and social control. Capital may in fact require these repressive apparatuses. The situation in China, which is now being cited as the saviour of the global economy, proves that there is no necessary relation between capitalism and democracy. It could well be the case that this combination of authoritarianism and consumer capitalism is the future for much of the planet.

This should make us skeptical of an overly sanguine reading of the 2010 safety and security mobilization. As a marketing strategy it succeeded because it presented an *idealized* version of South Africa. This in itself is not a bad thing, and there is something to be said for its countering of pernicious stereotypes. But assuming that these plans will provide a template for the future, in terms of protecting ordinary citizens, ignores the special circumstances of 2010. The chief aim was exclusive: to protect foreign visitors. The trajectory of state policing may be to focus on their efforts on bunkered spaces of consumption for the (relatively) rich to the detriment of other areas. This is not some phantasmagorical threat. It is already a reality in some ways, and the World Cup may prove in time to provide a further catalyst to this.