Errors, Omissions & Emergency Changes
This page is intended to document any errors that are discovered in the electoral system or processes, or any omissions from the originally published documentation. It is hoped that it'll remain empty for the duration of the election.
At 8.30AM on 19 August 2010, two candidates were removed from the presidential election configuration having withdrawn from the election. Details of this change are documented below:
- SRC Elections 2009 Completed Emergency Change Checklist (1)
- SRC Elections 2010 Patch (1)
- SRC Elections 2010 mtree Checksums for Electoral Source Code (1)
At 10:24AM we were informed that another candidate had withdrawn. Unfortunately it was not feasible to rectify this before the elections were due to open at 12PM. As a result the election system was disconnected from the network until the problem was resolved. This does not violate the integrity of the election, but did mean that people were unable to vote between 12PM to 2:20PM. To make up for the lost time, the closing time of the elections were extended by two and a half hours, until 2.30AM on 26 August 2010. Details of these changes are documented below:
- SRC Elections 2009 Completed Emergency Change Checklist (2)
- SRC Elections 2010 Patch (2)
- SRC Elections 2010 mtree Checksums for Electoral Source Code (2)
It was discovered that a mistake in the preparation of voters roll made no student eligible to vote. In brief the problem was that student numbers were used, rather than usernames (the difference being a leading "g"). This was an oversight on the part of the IT Division/Data Management Unit, and was corrected by 3.30PM. Full details are documented below:
- SRC Elections 2009 Completed Emergency Change Checklist (3)
- SRC Elections 2010 Patch (3)
- SRC Elections 2010 mtree Checksums for Electoral Source Code (3)
On the morning of Tuesday 25 August 2009, a bug in the running electoral system was discovered by the electoral officer whilst attempting to view interim results for the election. This bug affects the calculation of results, and has no impact on the collection of votes. At this stage, it is largely a cosmetic problem and does not influence the outcome of the election; it simply prevents the electoral officer from seeing and/or releasing interim or provisional results. Consequently a decision was made to leave the electoral system as-is, and not to make any changes to the running election.
In order to be able to release the final results of the election, however, a change will need to be made to the electoral system. This change will occur during the post-election proceedure in the presence of the electoral observers. At this time, a patch will be applied to the electoral system to correct the problem. A SHA256 hash of the patch file will be verified before it is applied to ensure that the same file as is published here is applied, thus preserving the transparency of the source code. The SH256 hash of the patch to be applied is 576215ce2f8ba0dd7b8e052a66b38e3258495eb2424faad5b6bf38e7ed7a8d42.