Political Recruitment and Political Participation: Analyzing the Constituency Effect on Councillors’ Performance in Local governments of Uganda

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Abstract

Political participation is widely seen as a desirable practice in good governance at the local levels. It is believed to be an enabler of citizens to have a more meaningful say and more influence on the decisions concerning the nature of services delivered by local governments to their constituencies. Political recruitment is one of the processes intended to support effective political participation in the respective local governments. Theoretical and empirical evidence however, often tends to underestimate the significance of political recruitment on political participation with respect to the eventual performance of councillors. This paper will analyse the framework for political recruitment and political participation, and illustrate the resultant implications to councillors’ performance in Uganda’s local governments. Of the many associated arguments, the paper singles out the issue of constituency and attempts to explain its profound effect on the recruitment process and the subsequent political activity. The paper concludes that political participation of councillors is highly influenced by the recruitment factors of the non-territorial constituencies more than the visibly geographically territories being represented.

Key words: Political recruitment, Political participation, Local governments, Councillors, Representation, and Constituency

Introduction

In many polities, citizens exercise rights of participating in the political decision making process. However, it is widely argued that the citizen’s role replaces neither their roles as subjects nor their parochial roles but rather supplements them (Almond and Verba, 1963). Almond and Verba’s observation suggest that citizens’ political participation is meant to influence the decisions for the common good as well as for personal interests.
They hold however that most individuals always put the role of themselves and their parochial interests higher in priority compared to their interests as citizens and that the impact of their participation may be negligible. While this situation may be attributed to different explanations such as social conditions, education, and the role of gatekeepers (Verba and Nie, 1972; Pippa Norris, 1996; Cornway, 2011), there is a view that the process through which political representatives obtain positions correspond to their subsequent performance in the political activity (Prewitt, 1970a). The political selection as well as political participation is greatly associated with what Urbinati and Warren (2008) recognize as a territorial residence (geographical constituencies) and non-territorial constituencies. These are the linkages that this paper sets to unveil in the subsequent discussion.

**Political Participation in a Decentralized Uganda: A Succinct Background**

Uganda’s local government system can be traced as far back as the colonial period, through the pre-independence era of the 1950s, up to the post-colonial period of 1970’s, and through to today. The country’s post-independence constitution of 1962 provided for a highly decentralized system, mixing federal and semi-federal structures in the different geographical localities, which was later abolished in 1966 when all authority centred in the presidency. The post-independence regimes\(^1\), however, proved unfavourable for active local government operations until the mid-1980s, when the National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power (MOLG, 2006; Uganda, 1995). The present decentralization policy in the country was, therefore, conceived in the late 1980s and implemented in phases through the early 1990s as an administrative-political reform, considered the most suitable mode of governance through which political recruitment would meaningfully support political participation for the benefit of the citizens (Kiwanuka, 2012).

The Uganda local government system has had a long history with the present system of political structures and the widespread political participation backed legal

\(^1\)Uganda attained its independence in 1962, therefore the period referred here relates to those regimes thereafter.
frameworks including the *Resistance Councils and Committees Statute* of 1987, the *Resistance Council Statute* (the decentralisation statute) of 1993 that enabled political, financial and administrative autonomy of local governments (MOLG 2006). Subsequently, the enactment of the 1995 *Constitution* and the *Local governments Act 1997*, fully entrenched the decentralization policy. Each of these laws has had a profound implication on the recruitment and political participation of local councillors as well as their political positions. This paper blends the relationship between the recruitment process influences and the political activity of the local government councillors.

**Local Governance Structure in Uganda**

Decentralization is Uganda’s central governance system and is enshrined in the country’s constitution (Uganda, 1995). Accordingly, a range of powers, responsibilities and functions have been transferred to local governments throughout the country. These powers and responsibilities include decision-making, raising and allocating resources, determining and providing a range of services in a jurisdiction, planning and budgeting, and making ordinances and bylaws as provided by the local government Act (Uganda, 1997).

The country’s local government system is formed in a five-tier pyramidal structure from local councils 1-5 (Village, Parish, Sub-count/Town council/City division, County/Municipality, and District/City). The district Local Council (LC5) or City Council (CC) depending on whether it rural or urban respectively, is the highest political unit in a jurisdiction, with the District Chairperson/Mayor being its political head, elected through universal adult suffrage [UAS] (Uganda, 1997). The Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) or Town Clerk (TC) is the head of public servants in the district/city council and is also the accounting officer. The CAO/TC is appointed by central government and is responsible for the implementation of lawful council and central government resolutions (Uganda, 1997).

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2 The Local Government Act 1997 has been incorporated in a comprehensive Uganda Law Book and currently is cited as “The Local Governments Act Cap 243”
The lower local governments (LLGs) are below the district in both urban and rural areas and include the municipalities (LC4 level) and the city divisions/town councils and sub-counties (LC3 level), including all political representatives elected under UAS and all appointed administrative personnel. The county, parish, and village councils are the administrative units which perform such duties as are assigned to them by their respective LGs. LGs in Uganda are body corporate with powers enshrined in the Act (Uganda, 1997). With regard to personnel management, all persons in the service of LGs (except CAOs, Municipal and City TCs) are employed by their respective higher local governments.

**Figure 1: Local Council in Uganda**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rural LCs</th>
<th>Urban LCs</th>
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<td><strong>District</strong></td>
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<td><strong>County</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Sub counties</strong></td>
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<td><em><em>Parishes</em> Town Boards</em>**</td>
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<td><strong>Wards</strong>*</td>
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<td><strong>Villages</strong></td>
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** Represent Local government councils (LG) * indicates an administrative Units (AU)

The decentralization framework in the country provides for affirmative action and special representation of the most vulnerable groups, which include: women, youth, and the people living with disabilities at all levels (Uganda, 1995; Uganda, 1997). This is accomplished by reserving seats and quota systems for those groups of people (Devas, 2005). Local councils are accordingly mandated to select amongst themselves a speaker, a deputy speaker, and executive committee to steer the leadership of the local governments. The system of election of all councillors is *first-past-the-post* by secret ballot under the
universal adult suffrage with exceptions for the youth and disability councillors who are elected by their corresponding electoral colleges (LGA 1997: Section 10 and 23). The Administrative Units (AU), on the other hand, consist of the executive committees from lower level administrative units. At the village level - the lowest unit - the executive committee is selected from the entire population of the designated area.

**Recruitment Process for Councillors in the Local Governments**

Current Ugandan law provides standard guidelines for structures and requirements for council members and leaders. An eligible council member (to be selected by adult voters) must be a citizen of Uganda and a registered voter of a sound mind who is not a cultural or traditional leader as defined in the constitution. The law governing the electoral process under Sec 116 of the LGA additionally states:

Under the multiparty political system, a public officer, a person employed in any Government department or agency of the Government, an employee of a local government or an employee of a body in which the government has a controlling interest, who wishes to stand for election to a local government office shall resign his or her office at least thirty days before nomination day in accordance with procedure of the service or employment to which he or she belongs (LGA 1997)

To underscore this regulation, the law under section 116 (6) of the LGA prohibits a public officer employed by a particular local government from being a councillor for any other higher or lower local government. The law permits only public officers to be elected for political offices of the village and parish level.

Candidates for posts of chairpersons of local councils, in addition to these procedural nomination demands, are required to be registered voters and residents of their respective electoral areas. They should be at least thirty years old and not more than seventy five years old. Further, for a district or city council, the candidate for the post of the chairperson should possess at least a Ugandan Advanced Certificate of Education (UACE) or
equivalent qualification and under Sec 112 of the LGA they are subjected to payment of a non-refundable fee of ten currency points\(^3\) for a district or city, five currency points for a municipality and two-and-a-half currency points for a city division, town or sub county. Under Section 119 of the LGA, all other councillors for a district, city or municipality must pay two-and-a-half currency points while councillors for other lower local councils (town, city division and sub county) require paying one currency point.

These provisions, of course, have a big implication on the nature of the candidates competing for available political positions in the local councils. It is obvious that a few candidates will find much interest in vying for positions that will deprive them of their prime means of earnings. A councillor in the first instance is a part-time politician and unless the selected councillor of a higher local council obtains a position of council chair, executive member or speaker, he or she earns no salary except a meagre allowance for council sessions. Other salaried local council leaders are the chairpersons for sub counties, municipal division, and town councils – positions which only a few women access. Choosing to be a local council politician therefore requires a well calculated comparative advantage of candidates as the positions require bravery and opportunity costs for employment. A few educated and formally employed individuals therefore may reluctantly rush for politics in the face of uncertain future careers. Resigning a salaried job for a temporary non-paying political position of four years that may or may not be regained (after that term of office) is not only short-sightedness but rather a huge blunder for the economically constrained local citizens. Again, the financial requirement for candidature registration is a big disincentive for many of the would-be some interested candidates whose meagre incomes cannot sustain the electoral activities. The next section of the paper presents the theoretical foundations in turn, for political recruitment and political participation.

\(^3\) A legally stipulated currency point is equivalent to twenty thousand Uganda Shillings (about $12) according to the LGA Sixth Schedule
**Political Recruitment Theory**

Political recruitment is a generic process by which institutions fill political offices through mechanisms that narrow the entire population to a few who hold office (Prewitt, 1970a). It is a selection process that enables the narrowing down to a few political leaders from a wider population as illustrated below:

**Figure 2: The Chinese Box Puzzle**

![Diagram of The Chinese Box Puzzle]

*Source: Adopted from Prewitt, 1970a:8*

In the above model, Prewitt theorizes a political leadership recruitment process that begins with the entire population in the outer box. The population is presumed to contain a large number of citizens who meet minimum legal requirements for political eligibility such as age and residence.
This outer box consists of a number of social groups based on their ascribed statuses like gender, race, religion, and place of birth or achievement traits like income, occupation and education. Prewitt holds that persons in some certain social groups are highly favoured over those belonging to other social groups (Prewitt 1970a:23).

From the entire population there is a comparatively smaller set of the politically attentive public that fits in the second box. This box consists of citizens of such social statuses as wealth, occupation, education, and dominant race or religion, and is therefore the ones presumed to form the dominant social stratum in this, the second largest box of the model. This stratum results from the social basis of leadership theories which presuppose that persons with high status will have greater political life-chances than those of average or low prestige. This assumption therefore suggests that class distinctions are of great relevance in the political leadership recruitment process. Prewitt acknowledges this fact when he argues that political leaders are never random samples of the population but rather are drawn disproportionately from more favoured social groups and from the upper end of status hierarchy than from socially or economically disadvantaged groups (p.25).

From the dominant social stratum, Prewitt hypothesizes an inner box of the politically active stratum comprised of citizens who run the political parties, serve on local commissions, dominate community activities, are conversant with the political game, and who exhibit the desire to nominate themselves or be nominated by others for numerous public tasks. The politically active presumably are more likely to select them or be selected for public office. Their recruitment is influenced by the political socialization theories for individuals involved in public affairs over a lifespan from their families, school politics, early adulthood that finally to elected politics; and mobilization theories explaining those individuals who have made sudden decisions to be concerned with the public affairs and who become politically active at the same time as they join politics.

The inner box consists of Recruits and apprentices and contains individuals who undergo processes of channelling political aspirations and of mobilizing their talents and resources to public office. This is considered as a crucial stage in the recruitment process because it drives political careers and ambitions. The recruitment to a political career of
recruits and apprentices, according to Prewitt, may be nurtured in the small, informal and intimate groups of friends, family, community actives, councillors, or work associates. These groups influence political choices and activities of individuals through advice, suggestions and social pressures.

The next-to-last inner box of the Puzzle contains the political candidates who are, according to electoral theories, subjected to a selection process that channels them into the few political leaders contained in the inner-most box. Elections and the related activities like candidacy and campaigns provide a final screening and sorting tool for obtaining the necessary citizens to hold public office - the governors.

The critics of this theory consider the Prewitt model as being quite simplistic with an assumption that political leaders systematically pass through all the stages (intermediate boxes) of recruitment from outer boxes before reaching in the inner-most box. This mode of thinking fails to recognize that elections apply at all levels of the recruitment process and within each of the strata presented in the model. There is a further presumption that the process of recruitment is always through many stages and that it is largely done on the basis of natural and acquired social categories. Studies elsewhere, and particularly in Uganda, however, show occurrences of competitive selection irrespective of these predetermined social statuses of those individuals running for political offices (Kyohairwe, 2009).

**Theoretical Framework for Political Participation**

While a common definition for political participation still remains controversial, it is widely considered to be “activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba & Nie 1972:2). Accordingly, political participation can also be conceived as “those actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or support government and politics” (Milbrath, 1977:2). Parry Geraint et al., on the other hand, use a broad definition of political participation to signify “taking part in the process of formulation, passage and
implementation of public policies” (Geraint, 1992:16). In all three perspectives, political participation suggest an active role citizens’ in influencing political outcomes, which according to Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba does not only depend on the government system but also on social attitudinal characteristics of individuals (Almond, 1989).

These definitions suggest citizens have an active role in influencing political outcomes, which according to Almond and Verba not only depends on the government system but also on social attitudinal characteristics of individuals. Verba, Nie and Kim (1978) hold that political participation largely concerns activities that are participatory. Their context of participation is limited to the government and to a system with regular and legal ways of influencing politics (Verba, Nie, et al 1978:49-50). In spite of the complex definition of political participation, there seems to be common literature on the inherent modes of the concept, which are the subject of discussion in the next section.

**Modes of Political Participation**

Political participation is theorized to appear in a number of activities which Verba and Nie (1972) classify into: electoral modes of activity which influence leaders by applying diffuse pressure; and, the non-electoral modes of activity that influence leaders through communication of information. The electoral modes, according to Verba and Nie, include voting and campaign activity and are considered to be the major ways in which individuals participate in politics. The non-electoral modes include the citizen-initiated contacts and group organization activity. These propositions have been perceived by a host of other political theorists to encompass a wide range of actions such as: joining pressure groups, participating in public inquiries and demonstrations, holding meetings with representatives, lobbying, petitioning and problem presentation to those in public offices. The actions also extend to writing letters, making monitory contributions, and seeking public office (Geraint, 1992; Milbrath, 1977; Prewitt, 1975; Verba, 1978). Voting, for instance, is seen as a tool for selecting the political leaders. With minimal communication, this activity is intended to exert influence over leaders through generalized pressure. Its scope and outcome are considered to be broad, covering all citizens. Political campaigns
are also seen as an activity for exerting pressure and influence on the political leaders. It is credited for its ability to convey more information to the government and the public in comparison to the vote. Group activities convey much information to leaders and but they also exert pressure through a number of political actions such as lobbying and demonstrations. They focus on influencing decisions on community problems, as compared to citizen-initiated contacts that offer information regarding particular problems.

Sherry Arnstein (1969) similarly theorizes participation into a form of an eight-rung ladder that is broadly classifiable into “non-participation”, tokenism, and citizens’ power, as illustrated below:

Figure 3: The ladder of Citizens’ Participation (adopted from Sherry Arnstein, 1969)

According to Arnstein, the elementary purpose of inclusion of citizens into political activity or government programs is for purposes of educating them or psychologically
making them feel appreciated or “cured”. At this level political participation is much manipulation and therapy, which Arnstein regards as "Non-participation". When political participation is used as a relatively more useful tool, it is in the form of tokenism, in which citizens are involved for purposes of being more informed, consulted, and placated. They can also consult, voice their concerns, and advise however much these may have limited impact on the power holders. Some levels of participation that may be more yielding, with those involved in the political activity being more influential partners to collaborate in making and effecting decisions, are delegated power or wielded power by obtaining political seats and managerial positions.

From the above it becomes clear that political participation is contextual and can only be understood by looking at different perspectives in which it appears in comparison to the intent of the participation by those who are directly involved in the participatory activities, those they represent and the people who the participation is intended to influence.

The constituency effect on councillors’ performance

The interest in this discussion is to assess the reality between theories and practice of political recruitment and political participation on the performance of councillors. The nature of local councils in Uganda make a recruitment process quite distinctive compared to the national parliamentary and presidential elections in other countries where political parties engage in intensive primary elections that gradually narrow down the many contending. The national elections in Uganda are conducted in broader and well defined constituencies, structured as counties (and districts, in the case of some women parliamentarians that are elected under affirmative action). The local government councils, on the contrary, apply a direct meritocracy of candidature in an ambiguous multiparty-system electoral process. Given that at the lower levels of local governance, councils are fused with the ruling political party structures, the recruitment process of different party candidates becomes problematic. Although the Local Government Act provides for multi-party governance in local governments, there is still a lot of disharmony in the procedures,
roles, representation, and operations of local councils under the multiparty dispensation. The legal framework of the decentralization policy and the political parties is inconsistent with the intention of the country’s decentralization policy (Kiwanuka, 2013; Wasswa & Terrell, 2011). More complexity further emerges in the fact that ascribed statuses of sex, age and disability are merged with meritocracy recruitment. The local council composition requires a quota of 1/3 of the seats for women, one male and female youth, and one disabled male and female as mandatory representatives of those respective social groups.

Urbinati and Warren (2008) assess ways in which the modern state introduces a territorial residence (geographical constituencies) as a fundamental condition for political representation vis-à-vis the status and corporate-based representation which existed in pre-contemporary democracies. They note that territorial constituency has indeed demonstrated a historical significance of political equality by progressively including a larger representation of individuals in the power sharing (Urbinati and Warren 2008:389). Whereas the argument for political equality of geographical constituencies is seemingly convincing, Urbinati and Warren contend that territoriality identifies only one set of ways in which individuals are involved or affected by collective structures and decisions. They appreciate the existence of many non-territorial issues such as religion, ethnicity, nationalism, social and gender movements, and professional or individual identities. They also note the prevalence of extra territorial issues like migration, global trade, environment, NGOs, associations, and social networks, each of which make representative claims and serve representative functions (p.390).

The argument raised, therefore, is that whereas councillors are meant to fully participate in local politics in the form of the interests of those being represented in their constituencies, the ambiguity surrounding territorial and non-territorial constituency structures complicates both the political recruitment process as well as political participation. From the Uganda local council recruitment processes explained earlier, it is clear that local councillors derive their representative authority from diverse groups with various interests. This generates multiple legitimacies and insurmountable electoral accountability demands. Councillors are entangled in performing political activities that not
only involve controversies between local versus national interests, but also the political parties versus the sitting government priorities, and personal versus communal interests. What does this mean in terms of political activity? The likely implication is that the principal-agency effect applies and a situation arises where government, political parties, interests groups, and corporatist organizations set political agendas that determine how the political activity of councillors is conducted. The lower and middle level rungs of Sherry Arnstein’s theory come to manifestation at this point, where some councillors are largely manipulated and moderately consulted or informed of the political actions. While they have a platform for speaking, the impact of their voices, as well as the approaches used in demanding their constituency interests, may be highly compromised by the multiplicity of the territorial and non-territorial constituencies being represented.

An example of such a controversy regards women councillors who have been accused of not representing their fellow women and not having a lot of impact on the constituencies which they represent. Women representatives in the Ugandan local governments are elected by adult voters and they represent two sub-counties in the district or municipal divisions in the municipality. They are elected by female as well as male voters. They are further nominated and sponsored by their individual political parties, massively supported by their relatives, friends, and colleagues in their informal networks as well as by national politicians. These women councillors (similar to other special groups like the youth and the disabled) derive their political participation mandate from multiple principals but they are expected to distinctively cater to the interests of women. Keeping in mind that women are not a single social category, they are expected to conduct a number of activities including joining pressure groups, attending public inquiries and demonstrations, holding meetings with representatives, lobbying, and petitioning and problem presentation to public offices. The critics of women councillors tend to forget that all these activities are for and against one interest group or another and may antagonize those constituencies that authorize women to act politically.

These arguments notwithstanding, we note that on many occasions, councillors (including women councillors) do have an impact as a result of their delegated political
mandate being derived from the existing legal frameworks such as the Local Government Act and the Constitution of Uganda. They make relevant policies, laws, and exercise legislative control over government bureaucrats in their areas of jurisdiction. They also vote for fellow local and national politicians, a mechanism that enhances the political and social accountability to the citizens of those holding political power. These arguments, therefore, are reflective of the fact that political participation of councillors is not a totally isolated activity and that sizeable “political dividends” are often realized in local governance systems. However, looking at the recruitment processes that involve a mixture of electoral colleges and the entire geographical constituencies and taking into account ascribed statuses like sex, age, and physical abilities, as well as achievement traits like education and financial abilities, we recognize the impact of these factors on the intended political activity.

**Conclusion**

The paper has highlighted the penchant for decentralization and presented the background to Uganda’s current decentralized institutional structures. It also offered an overview of the recruitment process in the Ugandan local council structures. The theories of political recruitment and political participation were meant to enable contextualization on how the roles of the councillors are influenced. Citing an example of women councillors, the paper illustrated that the threat of territorial and non-territorial constituencies to councillors’ political participation. The diversity of the constituencies was seen not only as influencing the loyalty of councillors that are respectively authorized but also the mode of participation that these councillors are likely exercise. We finally note, however, that even when constituencies may be seen as constraining the political participation of councillors, there is a recognizable gain that councillors have in influencing political action based on the mandate derived from legal frameworks pertaining local governance.
References:


The Relationship between Intergenerational Solidarity and Happiness of the Elderly in Thailand

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Abstract

The complex interactions between people of three or more generations, which is the cornerstone of intergenerational solidarity, has recently gained more attention from academic research but still receives little attention from policy makers and practitioners. This is in part because research that links intergenerational solidarity with happiness of seniors is rare. Many have taken the interaction among different generations, particularly within the context of family, for granted. In Thailand, as the nuclear family became the predominant form of family structure, replacing the strongly knitted extended structure, the once strongly knitted extended structure contributing to multi-generational interactions have become less visible, making it more difficult to discern the impact of intergenerational solidarity on the happiness of the elderly. Based on a survey done in Udon Thani Province in northeast Thailand, this study describes the nature and degree of intergenerational solidarity within the context of typical rural families. From examining components of intergenerational solidarity such as family living arrangements and meal sharing, the findings indicate that the elderly who live in an environment of strong intergenerational solidarity are more likely to feel happier than their counterparts without these strong bonds. Setting the context within the
larger context of the policy of governmental support for the elderly in Thailand, we recommend that the Thai government adopt formal programs promoting intergenerational solidarity. In addition to providing the current, meager monthly living allowance, the government should consider policies that would further the happiness of the elderly by promoting intergenerational solidarity as Thailand becomes an aging society.

**Keywords:** Intergenerational Solidarity, Intergenerational Relationships, Elderly Happiness, Thailand, Aging

**Introduction: Elderly in Thailand and governmental policy**

The rapid evolution of Thailand's socio-economic landscape is having an impact on the Thai family structure. Historically, the extended family setting with at least three generations living together was typical among Thai households. Recently, however, this has given way to an increasing number of nuclear households comprising only parents and children, representing about 55% of the total families in 2008 (National Statistical Office, 2009). This transition is changing the social fabric and the role of the elderly in society. Furthermore, population aging increasingly experienced in Thailand also leads to heightened concern for the vulnerability of the elderly (Prachuabmoh, 2014).

What are the challenges facing the elderly in Thailand? As the theory of modernization posits, the social status of the elderly faces decline as modernization advances in Thai society. Based on subsequent refinements of the modernization theory first advanced by Cowgill and Holmes (1972), Street and Parham (2002) interpret and identify four key aspects of modernization that undermine the status of older people: health technology, economic and industrial technology, urbanization and education. Taking into consideration criticisms of the modernization theory, Hooyman and Kiyak (2005) in their historical and cross-cultural analyses of aging have nevertheless indicated some empirical support to the modernization theory. As they have observed, modernization in many parts of the world is characterized by an effort to promote literacy and education, which tends to benefit the young. The advent of information technology (IT) further
disengages the elderly, as they are not able to keep pace with the rapid spread and modernization of IT, which youth view as an important source of knowledge and entertainment. In some countries in East Asia (e.g. Lam and Lee, 2005) and in Europe (e.g. Kokol, 2011), there have been attempts to increase the computer literacy of the elderly through lifelong learning programs. However, in Thailand, as in many other places in the world, the elderly generally have less formal education than their children, contributing to less attention among the public and policymakers to promote IT among the elderly. This phenomenon has widened the gap between the older and younger generations, and further contributed to the decline of esteem among the elderly, who were once revered for their status as repositories of traditional wisdom (or tacit knowledge).

The elderly are also disadvantaged from the employment perspective. While many elderly still want to work and earn an income to support themselves, the number of jobs for the elderly is decreasing over time. A national study of the elderly in Thailand found that only 38% were employed during any part of the week, and most of those were in the agricultural sector (Knodel, Prachuabmoh and Chayovan, 2013). Elderly are found to be increasingly low-income individuals (Chayovan, 1999). A study by Knodel, Prachuabmoh and Chayovan (2013) found that 80% of the elderly received the government welfare stipend for persons over age 60, and 11% of them cited this as their main source of income. Approximately 1.5% of the respondents have no other source of cash income than the old age allowance. Overall, it is estimated that 16% of Thai elderly do not have sufficient income to meet their essential needs (Knodel, Prachuabmoh and Chayovan, 2013).

Most Thai elderly, especially those over age 65, are also reported to experience declining health; more elderly than before are suffering from chronic illness, disability, and dependence on others to perform daily functions (Jitapunkul and Suriyawongpaisarn, 1999). Approximately 3.8% of the elderly have restricted mobility, thus many are housebound. Of this group, nearly 29% receive assistance from the community, but nearly one in five (18.5%) lack a regular care provider (ibid.1999).
In attempting to address the challenges of the elderly, Thailand recently made an evolving process of policy change toward its aging population (Knodel, 2014). Before Thailand’s demographic transition to a low-fertility society, the number of elderly without children or grandchildren was relatively small, and government assistance to those elderly who were not self-sufficient consisted of subsidized housing at assisted-living facilities provided by the then Department of Welfare, Ministry of Interior. Conceptual thinking and policy towards the elderly began to shift as it became clear that Thai society was aging fast, and there is an increased concern on how demographic aging will affect Thai households.

In the early 1990s, free government medical services were made available to the elderly. In 1993, the Department of Welfare initiated a financial assistance program to provide monthly subsistence allowances in the amount of 200 baht⁴ per month to some indigent elderly in certain rural areas (Knodel and Chayovan, 2008). The coverage of the program was later expanded to include more indigent elderly and the amount of allowances increased to 500 baht per month. Before 1999, only civil servants and public employees were entitled to receive a pension and other retirement benefits. It was not until 1999 that the social security system for employees of the private sector was institutionalized and incorporated as an old age pension plan. However, members are required to contribute for a period of at least 15 years to be eligible for pension or retirement benefits. Therefore, the first payments of old age pension and benefits did not start until 2014, and the amounts the elderly receive under this scheme are relatively small. To date, Thailand still does not have a fully functional national pension program. Persons who are self-employed and informal sector workers are not part of the program. Although a pension plan that covers these groups has been enacted, it has not been implemented due to a lack of political will of the national leaders (Knodel, 2014).

Indirect benefits for the elderly have also been made in the form of tax breaks. Starting in 2004, income earners who care for or support their parents or parents-in-law are entitled to an income tax deduction of up to 30,000 baht for each elderly parent under

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⁴ In today’s exchange rate (December 2014), 100 baht equals approximately 3 US Dollars
their care and support. Health insurance policies bought by children for the benefits of their elderly parents or parents-in-law are also tax deductible.

More recently, in 2009, the government of Thailand implemented the Old Age Allowance Program for the indigent elderly in rural areas. In this program, means testing that was used earlier to decide who was eligible for the allowance was dropped. Eventually, this allowed all Thai nationals aged 60 or older who were not entitled to retirement benefits from another source to receive a small monthly allowance of 500 baht per month\(^5\) (Knodel, 2014). Since 2011, progressive living allowance rates have been implemented. The amount of 600 baht is allowed for eligible elderly aged 60-69, 700 baht for those aged 70-79, 800 baht for aged 80-89, and 1,000 baht for aged 90 and above. Despite the increase in progressive rates, the amount received by the elderly is still far below the estimated actual basic living costs of 6,000 baht per month (Kamnuansilpa et al., 2004).

Thailand is continuing to make significant policy changes with rising awareness of its aging population. However, they are restricted mostly to welfare provisions with a lack of attention on social and emotional well-being and happiness. There needs to be a newer concept that would not view the elderly as society’s dependents, but instead as social capital that would bolster the role of the elderly in the community and society at large. Furthermore, to increase the quality of life of the elderly there must be a corresponding improvement in the intergenerational relationship in the family and the relationships of the elderly with their children and grandchildren, in particular.

In most families with children and grandchildren, the younger assist the older generation in various ways. Reciprocally, grandparents often provide childcare for their grandchildren in the event that the middle generation works outside the home, is divorced, separated, deceased or incarcerated. This shifting and exchanging of roles is found both in extended and nuclear families (Silverstein, Giarrusso and Bengtson, 2003). Indeed, it is a cultural tenet of Thai society that children are expected to return the beneficence to their

\(^5\) This is unchanged since 1993. To give a sense of this amount, according to the Thailand Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, the national poverty line in Thailand was 29,046 baht (PPP $ 1442) per capita in 2011. Given the 500 baht per month payment, that is 6,000 baht per year or 20% of the poverty level.
parents for giving them life and raising them. This reverence for elders certainly extends to grandparents, as well. This norm was prevalent at all levels of Thai society, regardless of socio-economic status, and helped to preserve intergenerational solidarity in Thailand and confer the sense of happiness for Thai elderly.

From the analytical framework of intergenerational relationships and intergenerational solidarity, this paper thus aims to test the hypothesis that intergenerational solidarity significantly contributes to a self-reported overall happiness among the elderly. Grandparenthood is an important area of intergenerational relationships that has an impact on the well-being of the elderly. In Thailand, Kamnuansilpa and Wongthanavasu (2005) have studied the burdens and positive values of senior citizens and found uneven awareness of their role as a grandparent and how that role could improve quality of life and happiness. A significant proportion of the elderly is found to lack good relationships with their grandchildren and this reflects in a deficiency in intergenerational solidarity. The researchers also found that greater intergenerational solidarity is present in three-generation households when compared with nuclear family households as expressed through mutual love and caring among its members. In fact, it was observed that grandchildren often actually showed more love and caring for their grandparents than for their parents. Grandchildren also help to create a web of psycho-emotional connections between the three generations. Similarly, grandparents often say they love their grandchildren as much or more than their own children (Hornboonherm, 2007). The intergenerational nexus provides a framework for analysis of the happiness and well-being of the elderly across the psycho-social and emotional dimensions (Kamnuansilpa and Thang, 2012) as well as the psycho-economic, physical, and labor dimensions (Hornboonherm et al., 2009).

**Literature Review and Research Focus**

This paper is positioned in intergenerational studies, referring to theoretical and empirical research that focused on intergenerational relations, including its effects on a sense of happiness and well-being in the elderly, the nature of relationships between the
elderly and second-generation relatives (not necessarily children of the elderly), and the type of support and care that the elderly receive from the younger generations (Lowenstein and Katz, 2005; Wolf and Ballal, 2006; Lowenstein, 2007; Hsieh, 2011; Knodel, 2014). Specifically, this paper contributes to the ongoing research on the sense of happiness in the elderly and the factors that influence their happiness. It attempts to substantiate the argument that elderly who live with their children reported greater happiness than those who did not. In other words, strong intergenerational solidarity promotes a stronger sense of happiness among the elderly. A positive and loving relationship among the extended family should be associated with mutual support among the three generations. The authors view this dynamic as both a consequence and an indicator of intergenerational solidarity, in harmony with the findings of Kamnuansilpa and Thang (2012) and Hornboonherm et al. (2009).

The concept of intergenerational solidarity as applied in this research was adapted from the conceptual framework of the sociology of the family, first proposed by Bengtson (1970), to explain family relationships. From the initial focus of the framework in analyzing the generation gap in American families; it was later expanded to assess extended family relationships in single households (Bengtson and Mangen, 1988; Bengtson, 1991; Bengtson, 2001; Bengtson et al., 2005a; Bengtson et al., 2005b; Bengtson et al., 2005c). In the analysis of intergenerational relationships, Bengtson discussed factors that brought family members together and referred to these as “solidarity” attributes. Bengtson proposed that there are six dimensions to family stability and mutual support: (1) Structural solidarity; (2) Affectual solidarity; (3) Associational solidarity; (4) Functional solidarity; (5) Normative solidarity; and (6) Consensual solidarity.

Research on intergenerational solidarity by Maria Amparo Cruz-Saco and Sergei Zelenev (2010) expanded the concepts of Bengtson beyond household intergenerational relationships to a broader view of society at large. Cruz-Saco (2010) expressed the view that intergenerational solidarity is a cause and consequence of constructive interaction of members of different age groups in society. This phenomenon can be a force for socio-economic development and maintenance, as well as an antidote to social conflict. Butt
(2010) has observed that members of society, despite being of different generations, remain linked with each other and inter-dependent when they share the same values and needs. These links are manifest in formal and informal associations and organizations, which help build consensus through civil interaction and exchange. This resulted in intergenerational solidarity - a basis for transfer of knowledge, wisdom and culture from one generation to another.

**Study Area**

Data collection for this study occurred in Tambon Samprao, Muang District, Udon Thani Province. Similar to the other areas in the district, this location is undergoing rapid rural to urban transition. Since 2007, the amount of external investment in Udon Thani has increased dramatically in a range of sectors including trade, industry, hotels, and real estate (The Federation of Thai Industries, Udon Thani, 2007-2008; The Udon Thani Chamber of Commerce, 2009 – 2013). This influx of investment has had a spillover effect to the periphery, such as Tambon Samprao, which is experiencing socio-economic and cultural evolution, altering the way of life of the local population. One significant change is an increasing out-migration of the middle generation for livelihood elsewhere as a result of shrinking availability of farmland. This has resulted in a distorted demographic structure of predominately elderly and young children. Increasingly, the burden for care of infants and young children is falling on the grandparents as their children leave the community for either economic or social reasons. The fracturing of the extended family is threatening intergenerational solidarity in Tambon Samprao. This location thus provides a valid case study to understand this contemporary phenomenon, which is expected to happen in other rural areas in transition.

**Research Methodology**

In this study, the researchers developed an original survey questionnaire to test whether having good relationships with one's offspring contributes to the self-reported overall happiness of the elderly compared to those living alone and those without good
relationships with their offspring. It is important to test this hypothesis for statistical significance since the promise of intergenerational solidarity is of increasing importance as Thai society evolves from a rural to a provincial urban society.

The site for this research was an area in the Samprao Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO), consisting of 15 villages. Data collection focused on households with elderly persons in residence and can be further classified as follows: (1) Three-generation households in which the elderly are living with a married child (possibly with other children who have not yet married) and grandchildren; (2) Two-generation households in which the elderly are living with a childless married or unmarried child; (3) Households in which the elderly are living with their grandchild(ren) because their child(ren) has left the household for work outside the community; and (4) Households in which the elderly are living alone either by choice or because the children have moved away or they have been abandoned by the children and/or grandchildren. For each of the 15 villages, the researchers sampled one household for each of the four categories and one elderly resident, thus yielding a total sample of 60 households and 60 elderly persons for the Tambon. Ness (1985) observed that such a sample size is neither too small nor too large, but has limited robustness for multivariate analysis. That said, this modest sample size is appropriate for conducting qualitative data collection by in-depth interviews (IDI) and yet large enough to allow descriptive statistical analysis, bivariate logistic regression, and factor analysis. This research has received an ethical clearance by the Institutional Research Board (IRB) at the primary researcher's university.

Results

In the presentation of the results below, we first present descriptive statistics of the strength of the relationship between the elderly and their children/grandchildren, which comprises one component of intergenerational solidarity. Table 1 presents data that show that 18.3% of the elderly do not have children/grandchildren who are interested in them.

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6 While we did not include the questionnaire in this article, Table 1 contains the results and the structure of the questionnaire may be inferred.
In 11 out of the 60 sampled households, there is little or no communication between the elderly and the younger generations in the course of daily life. In addition, in ten households (17%) the children or grandchildren only rarely talk with the elderly members of the household. In 17 households (28.3%), the elderly were in conflict with their child(ren) or grandchild(ren). The causes leading to these conflicts as expressed by the elderly are mainly lack of respectful behavior and loss of temper on the part of the younger generations. These findings of conflict and neglect of elderly deserve special and urgent attention.

The data in Table 1 also shows that less than half of the elderly in this sample ate meals together with the child(ren) or grandchild(ren) in the household. Even when the analysis was restricted to only those elderly who lived with child(ren) or grandchild(ren), we still found that not more than 65% had a chance to enjoy a regular meal with their offspring in the household.

In addition to eating meals together, there are other ordinary activities that the elderly can do with their children/grandchildren such as watching TV. Given the universality of the TV in today’s Thai household, it is surprising that less than 30% of the elderly in this study watched TV with their children/grandchildren.

This study also found that only 13% of the sample of elderly worked with the younger members of the household in agricultural pursuits or kitchen gardening. Despite the urbanization of this location, agricultural production is still an important activity for family welfare and wellbeing. As mentioned earlier and supported by other studies (e.g. Knodel, Napaporn and Siriboon, 1991), Thai culture is still characterized by the expectation that children/grandchildren will, in some way, care for parents or grandparents when they are elderly. In this study, 82% of the elderly reported receiving physical care from children/grandchildren in the household. Young children will help their grandparents to lift heavy objects, retrieve items of need, or massage sore arms and legs. These minor activities may not seem to have economic worth, but there is positive psychosocial value of
this assistance and contact as it is one way of promoting intergenerational solidarity as well as an indicator of intergenerational solidarity itself.

On the other hand, the study also shows the contribution of the elderly to the younger generation, 85% of the sample elderly provided counsel to their children/grandchildren on life issues, and reinforcement of the cultural expectations for behavior. In practical terms, 70% of the elderly still provide financial/material assistance to their children or grandchildren. This assistance may consist of help with school fees, purchase of household appliances, down payments for purchase of a motorcycle and so on.

Table 1: Relationship between the Elderly and their Children/grandchildren in the Household

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics of the relationship</th>
<th>N=60</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conversation with the elderly in the household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict between the elderly and others in the household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of conflict between the elderly and others</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children/grandchildren do not respect the elderly</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannot control emotions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily activities performed together with the elderly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meals</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>48.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housework/cooking meals</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watching TV</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casual conversation</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work in the gardens, orchards, fields</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No activities involving the elderly</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Elderly gives money/material to children/grandchildren

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elderly provides life advice to children/grandchildren

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elderly provides assistance to children/grandchildren

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Elderly receives care from children/grandchildren

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>49</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This research aims to define the components of intergenerational solidarity and examine its relationship to the elderly’s self-reported happiness. Before assessing this relationship, it is important to understand how other variables affect the level of self-reported happiness of the elderly. The analysis using binary logistic regression shows clearly that the elderly who frequently or regularly dined with their children were more likely to report that they were happy with the way they had lived their lives (Table 2). The chances that they would be happy with the more amicable relationships with their children is fourteen times greater than the elderly (in the reference group but not shown in the table) who rarely or never had an opportunity to eat with their children. Furthermore, an analysis was also carried out to extract the independent effect of co-residence with their offspring. We found that the elderly who lived with either a son or daughter or a grandchild were 4.2 times more likely to express a sense of happiness than those who did not live with an offspring.

In Table 2, it is also indicated that the elderly who were living with a spouse were about 4.6 times more likely to say they were happy with their lives. Moreover, the logic of the analyses in Table 2 allows us to test the sense of happiness of the elderly in the absence
of filial or consanguineous relationship within the family. This conformed to our theoretical expectation; the elderly who were living alone were less likely than those who lived with at least one of their offspring or a spouse (reference groups) to report that they were happy. As a group, and in comparison with the reference group, those who lived alone only had 16.5% chance of feeling a sense of self-reported happiness. The differences between the groups of interest and the reference groups are statistically significant, thus implicating the importance and the effects of intergenerational solidarity, which undoubtedly involved a host of interaction patterns among family members of different generations, on the sense of happiness among the elderly in this study. Conceptually related to the analysis in this part, we noted that the relationships and the interactions with in-law on a daily basis did not seem to create a higher sense of self-reported happiness among the elderly.

The theoretical importance of intergenerational solidarity is accentuated when we found that other socio-economic and demographic variables were not clearly and statistically significant enough to differentiate the elderly on the basis of feeling of happiness. It is shown that higher income does not mean greater happiness: those with monthly income over 10,000 baht did not significantly report more happiness than those with income equal to or less than 10,000 baht, which is the reference group (odds ratio = 0.840). It can be construed that the elderly with income over 10,000 baht are more likely to be unhappy than those who earn less than 10,000 baht. Indeed, that the odds ratio (OR) is less than 1.000 suggests that this variable is moving in the direction of a negative correlation.

Apart from income, being economically active measured by having a job or working with children in agricultural pursuits is expected to be associated with a greater sense of elderly happiness. On the surface this may appear to be true as we found the odds ratio (OR) of 1.288. However, after controlling for other variables, this association is not statistically significant. The results suggest that trying to increase elderly happiness through income or economic contribution is not likely to have the intended effect.
Table 2: Adjusted Odds Ratios of Variables Related to Elderly Happiness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Whether the Elderly People Are Happy or Not</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dining with children</td>
<td>14.000** (3.207-61.125)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with son or daughter or grandchild</td>
<td>4.200* (1.008-17.500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with spouse</td>
<td>4.579* (1.097-19.114)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living alone</td>
<td>0.165*** (0.042-0.641)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with son or daughter in law</td>
<td>1.000 (0.232-4.310)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income higher than 10,000 baht</td>
<td>0.840 (0.232-3.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic activity</td>
<td>1.288 (0.358-4.631)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education or higher</td>
<td>0.217 (0.027-1.733)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age range (60-70)</td>
<td>1.655 (0.460-5.953)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:*** p < 0.001 ** p < 0.01 * p < 0.05

Thus, as income and economic role tend to be associated with education, educational attainment was included in the bivariate logistic regression analysis to explore its relationship with elderly’s sense of happiness. The OR for this association is 0.217, which also suggests that it signifies a negative correlation (i.e., those who finished less than secondary education, as the reference group, might be associated with more sense of

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7 Each variable that appears in Table 2 is coded as a dummy variable (0 and 1), consisting of a group of interest and a reference group. The reference group is the dataset that is not converted to a dummy variable and thus not included in the model.
happiness). However, this OR is also not statistically significant and any inferences of direction of association are conjectural. In sum, the data from Table 2 suggest that income and economic role, including education level, are not related to an elderly person’s sense of happiness in this study.

The next stage of the analysis explores the association of a demographic variable (age) with a sense of happiness. We are keenly aware that age is directly associated with health status, and health status is related to happiness. Thus, a proper analysis of age would control for health status. However, in this study, the sample was not subjected to health examinations, so it is not possible to control for this factor in the analysis. That said, direct observation of the elderly respondents in this study suggests that the sample had a similar level of health. If that is the case, then not including this variable in the analysis should not have an effect on the ability to test for an association between age and happiness. Data in Table 2 shows that age range has an OR of 1.655, meaning that young elderly aged between 60 and 70 years are likely to be happier than those over 70 years of age (reference group). However, this odds ratio is not statistically significant. Therefore, further research is needed to verify the effect of age and physical health on a feeling of happiness, which is also an indicator of psychological health among the elderly.

In sum, the economic, social, and demographic variables do not show statistically significant relationships with the elderly’s self-reported happiness. Clearly, all the variables, including a wide range of interactions of family members that emerged out of the filial and consanguineous relationship within the family, are statistically and significantly related to the sense of happiness among the elderly. This suggests that the elderly who regularly dined and lived with their children and/or spouse were happier than those who were living alone. The next stage of our analysis entails a more rigorous examination of the influence of the relationships among members of different generations in a family on the elderly’s sense of happiness and provides further evidence of our initial results.

At the next stage of our analysis, the method of principal component analysis was employed to reduce the number of variables by fitting them all on a single dimension of
intergenerational solidarity. As a result, three different possible components of intergenerational solidarity were identified. As appeared in Table 3, only two components are shown. One of the components, which was made up of 5 variables (income, living alone, living with spouse, dining with children, and economic activity) were dropped from further investigation because of low and statistically insignificant relationship. The two remaining components are shown in Table 3. Component 1 consists of being economically active, living with a son or a daughter, and living with spouse. Component 2 is made up of dining with family members, living with a son or a daughter, and living with spouse. These two components were evaluated with a binary logistic regression model to test which one had a stronger effect on a sense of happiness. Our analyses indicate that the second component of intergenerational solidarity has a significant relationship with the elderly's level of happiness at the statistical significant level of 0.001. Based on these results, we can confidently conclude that dining regularly with family members, living with a son or a daughter, and living with spouse increase the elderly's likelihood of being happy. As reflected in Table 3, the elderly who possess all these combined characteristics in Component 2 would have a greater chance, about 2.6 times, being happy than those who did not have anyone of these characteristics.

**Table 3:** Results from a Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Intergenerational Relationship and Happiness Components

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>df.</th>
<th>Adjusted Odds Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>S. E.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component 2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.608***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.339)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.382)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note***< p = 0.01
Table 4: Relationship between Happiness and Each Intergenerational Solidary Measure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IG Measures</th>
<th>Happy</th>
<th>Unhappy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dinning with Children*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>42 (91.3%)</td>
<td>4 (8.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>6 (42.9%)</td>
<td>8 (57.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living Situation*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living with others</td>
<td>39 (88.6%)</td>
<td>5 (11.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Adult child, grandchild, spouse and/or another person)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living alone</td>
<td>9 (56.3%)</td>
<td>7 (43.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>46 (82.1%)</td>
<td>10 (17.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary or higher</td>
<td>2 (50.0%)</td>
<td>2 (50.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 10,000 baht</td>
<td>30 (81.1%)</td>
<td>7 (18.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher than 10,000 baht</td>
<td>18 (78.3%)</td>
<td>5 (21.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically active</td>
<td>23 (82.1%)</td>
<td>5 (17.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economically inactive</td>
<td>25 (78.1%)</td>
<td>7 (21.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-70</td>
<td>26 (83.9%)</td>
<td>5 (16.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71 and over</td>
<td>22 (75.9%)</td>
<td>7 (24.1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Statistically significant at 0.05

The analyses of our data so far allow us to conclude that intergenerational solidarity is closely related to the elderly’s sense of happiness and consists of two variables: dining with family members and living situation (either with others or alone). To substantiate this point, we have also tested the relationship between each single intergenerational solidarity measure and how it contributes to a sense of happiness. The results are shown in Table 4. They confirm findings from the binary logistic regression analysis that a statistically significant relationship between each variable that forms a part of intergenerational solidarity measures and a sense of happiness.
It can be seen from Table 4 that 91.3% of the respondents who reported dining with their children were happy, as compared to only 42.9% for those who did not dine with their children. In terms of living with others, 88.6% of the elderly in this study who lived with others were happy with only 56.3% who lived alone being happy.

It can be noted that the positive effect of living with others is not quite as pronounced as the effect of dining with children and/or grandchildren. The Chi-square tests indicated that differences in the elderly’s sense of happiness as mentioned above are statistically significant at the 0.05 levels. Age is marginally significant (difference of 8%), with age 60-70 being somewhat happier than those over 70. Education, income, and economic activity were not statistically significant.

Discussion and Recommendations
While the effects of co-residential living on the elderly’s self-reported happiness are important, the joint activities between the elderly, themselves, and their children and grandchildren are more so. It is true that the elderly who live in the same household with their children or grandchildren will have more opportunity to dine together. However, we feel that the location of the meal seems less significant than being able to be with the children and grandchildren at mealtime. In major cities such as Bangkok, the effect of co-residential living may appear weakened as the middle generation and their children increasingly live in their own homes. However, they often live near enough to their parents allow having their small children stay with the grandparents during the workday, either at the grandparents’ house or at their house, and to return in the evening to have dinner together. Thus, we suggest that co-residential living alone does not fully or truly reflect intergenerational solidarity. In some cases, as noted in our study, co-residential living may be a cause of intergenerational conflict. In other cases, the intergenerational friction due to differences in values drives the younger generation to move out and independently live their lives.

It should also be noted that this study does not prove that intergenerational solidarity is either a cause or consequence of a sense of wellbeing in the elderly. The findings from the binary logistic regression and factor analysis are associative findings and not causal. Also, factor analysis generally requires a larger sample size than was used in this study to attain a proper level of robustness in the findings. The relatively small sample size in this study may cause instability in the values of statistical relationships of the variables. Future studies should make adjustments to confirm the results of this study.

Nonetheless, this research has clearly shown that intergenerational solidarity results from conducting everyday activities among family members of different generations. Such regular positive interaction is a consequence of and contributing factor toward mutual knowledge and understanding among the generations, which is the basis for genuine love and affection. Good, constructive intergenerational relationships are the foundation of intergenerational solidarity.
As a policy recommendation, we urge national policy makers to give more importance to intergenerational solidarity through formalization of policies that support and strengthen it. In the past, Thailand has used a traditional welfare approach to assisting the elderly, with an emphasis on small stipends for those over a certain age, in addition to other welfare benefits. At the very least, this study suggests that while such entitlement is fully welcomed by the elderly, it does not necessarily contribute to a sense of happiness in the elderly. Instead, it is recommended that the Thai government should adopt a new policy paradigm in taking care of the elderly, as Thailand is preparing for the prospect of becoming an aging society. In addition to putting its limited budget and resources into providing a meager sum of a monthly allowance for the elderly, the Thai government should consider making the elderly happy by promoting intergenerational solidarity. One example of a program under Royal patronage is the “Three Generation Weaving Family Love Center.” However, recent developments as of this writing place the future of this program in doubt. In the final analysis, we suggest that money alone is not enough to create a sense of happiness for the elderly. Further study should be devoted to maintaining and strengthening intergenerational solidarity during the transition from rural to urban society.

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An Overview of Community Policing In South Africa: Setting The Benchmarks For Community Engagement.

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Abstract

Chapter 7 of the South African Police Services Act, No 68 of 1995, deals with Community Police Forums (CPFs) and Boards with a provision in Section 19(1) for CPFs to be established at police stations that should be broadly representative of the community. This article examines the relationship and co-existence of community policing and community engagement within the South African Police Service. The article also suggests a platform for stakeholders and other role-players for promoting a comprehensive framework of options and policy approaches; dissemination of best practice and celebrating and rewarding achievements. The qualitative research approach was followed during CPFs meetings in the form of observation and interviewing the members thereafter. Feedback from the meetings is highlighted in the closing section and recommendations made.

Key words: Community Policing, Community Engagement, Community Policing Forums.

Introduction

The 1991 National Peace Accord in South Africa created the first framework for police accountability. In 1993, the South African Police Service (SAPS) adopted a community policing process to meet the safety and security requirements of all people in the country (Brogden & Shearing, 1994). The key principles outlined in these documents, namely, integrity, accountability, impartiality, and effective service, are those that inform models of community policing (Pelser, 1999).

The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 205 (3) prescribes Community Policing as the approach of policing to be adopted by the South African Police
Service (S.A.P.S.) to meet the safety and security requirements of all people in the country (Manual S.A.P.S., 1997). This is in pursuance of the prescripts of Chapter 7 of the South African Police Services Act, No 68 of 1995, which deals with Community Police Forums (CPF) and Boards with a provision in Section 19(1) for CPFs to be established at police stations and should be broadly representative of the community (Manual S.A.P.S., 1997).

Fundamental transformation was therefore needed to ensure that the S.A.P.S., developed into a community-oriented policing service which adopts a consultative approach to meeting the safety and security needs of the communities it serves.

The process was designed to establish a guiding document and for the CPFs to be housed under the ambit of the SAPS. It was a learning experience, allowing police, community members, and policy-makers to assess the effectiveness of different implementation procedures and the impact of community policing on local levels of crime, violence, fear and other public safety problems. The development of this community policing framework presented policing organizations with an opportunity to contribute to the evolution and implementation of community policing (Manual S.A.P.S., 1997).

A major objective of community policing is to establish active partnership between the police and the community, especially at local level through which crime, service delivery and community-police relations can be evaluated and plans to address problems implemented. The procedure for establishing a community policing forum states clearly those communities should be extensively consulted and educated through community meetings and workshops so that they know exactly what the terms of reference of these forums are. According to a Manual for the South Africa Police (1997:52), a community profile should also be conducted in order to ensure that the forum is a representative of the community.

Since the existence of Community Police Forums is a legislative requirement, data sources will include visits and information sharing at five Gauteng police stations, including the observing and attending to CPF meetings. This will assist in ascertaining whether the existing policy framework governing the Community Police Forum within the South African
Police Service impacts directly or indirectly on the quality of service delivery, sustainability, efficiency and effectiveness of the CPFs. The researcher will also evaluate the activities of the CPFs in line with the principles of the policy framework governing its operations and existence and the relationship with the SAPS. Reference will be made to existing publications, regulations and frameworks for community policing, both nationally and internationally.

The sharing of successes, failures, and frustrations was and will continue to be an inherent part of this process. Policing strategies that worked in the past are not always effective today. The desired goal, an enhanced sense of safety, security, and well-being, has not been achieved by the community. Practitioners agree that there is a pressing need for innovation to curb the crises in many communities, hence, the evaluation of the current policy framework governing the community police forums.

**Literature Review**

Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) described community policing as a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept that police officers and private citizens working together in creative ways can help solve contemporary community problems related to crime, social and physical disorder, and neighborhood decay. The philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving these goals requires police departments develop new relationships with law-abiding people in the community, allowing a greater voice in setting local police priorities and involving them in efforts to improve the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods. It shifts the focus of police work from handling random calls to solving community problems.

At the core of community policing lies the notion that it is a philosophy including all efforts of the police to achieve the goal of a closer relationship with the public (Wycoff, 1986). The police and community should work in partnership not only to solve problems, but to reduce the fear of crime, physical and social disorder. Flynn (2004) argues that partnerships need to be based on trust. Community policing partnership develop information exchange; the community provides the police with information about problem
conditions and locations, crime concerns, active criminals, and stolen property, and in return police provide the community with information pertaining to community fears, problems, tactical information and advice about preventing and reducing crime.

Friedman (1998) describes community policing as a policy and is aimed at achieving more effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality of life, improved police services and police legitimacy, through a proactive reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime causing conditions.

Fourie (1994) espouse the Dutch Police with their welfare-directed approach towards policing. The maintenance of law and order is approached out of the perspective of conflict management and crisis intervention. Tolerance is more important than conformity. There is more emphasis on solving social problems while the maintenance of law and order plays a minor role. The philosophy is to create conditions for social development.

On the other hand, Coquilhat (2008: 21) indicates that one of the key differences between problem-oriented and community policing is the involvement of the community. Problem oriented policing addresses problem faced by the community. However, the police are able to prioritize and work independently of the community to solve the community’s problems. In contrast, community policing relies on the community to define its problems or crime issues, and police and agencies work in partnership with the community to address the problem.

Historically, community policing has not just served to reorient the ways in which police view the community and their involvement in crime prevention, it has also led to fundamental changes in the organization of the police (Weisburd, Shalev & Amir, 2002:82). While traditional policing has relied on a military model of control, which centralized command and limited discretion of street level police officers, such a command structure has been assumed to be inconsistent with community policing, which naturally placed more emphasis on those police officers closer to the community. That is, the philosophy of community policing calls for a redefinition of the role the police and the operation of police
organizations, from traditional methods of professional law enforcement services (Schafer, 2002:700).

Cordner (1999) suggests that there are a number of mechanisms for achieving community engagement, which include systematic and periodic community surveys, fora, community meetings, and meetings with advisory groups and businesses. Furthermore, information can be collected from community police officers performance appraisals that reflect community activities; evaluating programs for effectiveness as well as efficiency and assessing the police’s overall performance on a wider range of key indicators.

Community engagement is therefore a planned process with the specific purpose of working with identified groups of people, whether they are connected by geographic location, special interest, or affiliation or identity to address issues affecting their well-being. The thinking of the term community to engagement serves to broaden the scope, shifting the focus from the individual to the collective, with the associated implications for inclusiveness to ensure consideration is made of the diversity that exists within any community (Queensland, 2001).

Community engagement is a process, not a program. It is the participation of members of a community in assessing, planning, implementing, and evaluating solutions to problems that affect them. As such, community engagement involves interpersonal trust, communication, and collaboration. Such engagement, or participation, should focus, on and result from, the needs, expectations, and desires of a community's members. (Planning NSW, 2003)

Marais (1992) espouse three main features of international community policing, namely:

- It aims to create a real partnership between the police and community, with the view to more effective protection of the community and a better quality of life.
- There is an emphasis on solving the underlying problems which lead to crime rather than simply arresting offenders.
• The police are more visible and accessible through beat patrol. This is achieved in conjunction with the assignment of staff to a specific, small, geographical area.

Community policing relies on the establishment of a clear, unambiguous link of values to behaviors. By creating a system of performance measurement, specific operational meaning can be given to seemingly abstract values. The guiding values central to community policing are trust, cooperation, communication, ingenuity, integrity, initiative, discretion, leadership, responsibility, respect, and a broadband commitment to public safety and security.

The practices or programs that are best for a particular community will have certain common characteristics, namely, the responsiveness to community needs; capacity of implementation with available resources; and supported by citizens and police and other partnering agencies.

Wycoff and Skogan (1985) highlight the behind-the-scenes elements critical to the performance as follows:

• First-line personnel who are capable of conducting community policing because appropriate recruitment and training strategies were implemented
• Supervisors who are selected, trained, and authorized to coordinate, monitor, and support community policing and problem-solving activities
• Managers with authority to make decisions at the operational level that are appropriate for the area for which they are responsible
• Long-term assignment of personnel to a geographical area so that they have the opportunity to know the residents of the area
• Regular structured contact between citizens and police to determine community needs
• Training for citizens to facilitate their involvement in decision-making and problem-solving
• Organizational policies and procedures that mandate and facilitate the above
• Individual and organizational performance assessment to determine whether the practices and objectives are accomplished.

Cavaye (2001) extends this definition as it specifically relates to the role of government, noting community engagement is the mutual communication and deliberation that occurs between government and citizens.

Community engagement can take many forms and covers a broad range of activities. Some examples of community engagement undertaken by government practitioners include:

• Informing the community of police directions of the government
• Consulting the community as part of a process to develop government policy, or build community awareness and understanding
• Involving the community through a range of mechanism to ensure that issues and concerns are understood and considered as part of the decision-making process
• Collaboration within the community by developing partnerships to formulate options and provide recommendations
• Empowering the community to make decisions and to implement and manage change

**Community Policing: The South Africa Perspective and Trends**

A major objective of community policing is to establish an active partnership between the Police and the community through which crime, service delivery and police-community relations can jointly be analyzed and appropriate solutions designed and implemented. This, however, requires that the Police should consciously strive to create an atmosphere in which potential community partners are willing and able to co-operate with the police (S.A.P.S., Manual, 1997). Matters of joint interest are discussed and engaged upon in these to promote co-operation, issues of mutual interest and tolerance between the police and the community in a policing area. In some areas, members of the community lose interest and become less committed once the rate of crime and other matters affecting them drops or become a threat to them.
The other end of the spectrum, community policing refers to the complete exclusion of the formal policing agency. For communities where there is a history of alternative systems of justice, community policing means policing by the community with the exclusion of the formal police agency. Community policing therefore refers to what are popularly known as self-defense committees, or people’s courts. This notion of community policing, which is explicitly opposed to the formal police agency, arises from a perception that the police are primarily agents of oppression rather than protectors of the community (Marais, 1992:3).

The other of the spectrum in which the term community policing is used is to describe the activities of the community in preventing crime which occur alongside the policing of the formal police agency. Neighborhood watches, and various block watch initiatives are structures which rely on the building of community support on a neighborhood basis and rely on awareness, communication and crime prevention to police the area. Neighborhood watches are not based on the use of coercive force and depend heavily on the formal policing agencies. However, some such community initiatives are vigilante-like in their activities, being dependent on a show of strength and often armed (Marais, 1992).

Research has proven that problems exist regarding the implementation of community policing. It is also common knowledge that stereotyped views exist about crime prevention and who should be responsible for it lead to misunderstanding. The term crime prevention is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the view that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On the other hand, the term community safety is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater participation from all sections of the community (Manual S.A.P.S., 1997). This notion is prevailing both within the police service and the community, while both groupings should assume responsibility for the successful implementation of crime prevention actions and C.P.F.

It is however, important that both the CPFs, SAPS and disgruntled community members find common ground and co-operate in order to serve and provide for an efficient
and effective community policing service through a sound and efficient policy framework. One of the difficulties that CPF members face is maintaining consistency when drawing attention to shortcomings in service delivery by the police. Working face to face with members of the police, there is a strong potential for community members to lose their independence and begin to perceive problems from a police perspective. CPF members face the danger of merely serving to legitimize existing police policies rather than to provide real community inputs and, where necessary, challenging the SAPS (Bruce, 1997).

Proper and adequate planning processes can assist in ensuring that issues of safety and security, transparency and accountability, joint problem identification and problem solving, effective and sustainable partnership are addressed through open and consultative processes. Particularly within a context of the limited availability of resources, integrated planning can attempt to eliminate the unnecessary and wasteful use of resources and the duplication of functions.

The general philosophy of community policing has also taken the notions of partnership and service to the community to their full extent.

**Basis for Community Engagement within Community Policing**

Community policing is democracy in action. It requires the active participation of local government, civic and business leaders, public and private agencies, residents, churches and schools. All who share a concern for the welfare of the neighborhood should bear responsibility for safeguarding that welfare. The implementation of community policing necessitates fundamental changes in the structure and management of police organizations. Community policing differs from traditional policing in how the community is perceived and its expanded policing goals. While crime control and prevention remain central priorities, community policing strategies use a wide variety of methods to address these goals. Some of the methods include the following:

*Mutual trust*
Establishing and maintaining mutual trust is the central goal of the first core component of community policing and community partnership. Community partnership means adopting a policing perspective that exceeds the standard law enforcement emphasis. This broadened outlook recognizes the value of activities that contribute to the orderliness and well-being of a neighborhood. These activities could include: helping accident or crime victims, helping resolve domestic and neighborhood conflicts, working with residents and local business to improve neighborhood conditions, providing social services and referrals to those at risk, protect the exercise of constitutional rights and provide a model of citizenship. These services help develop trust between the police and the community. This trust will enable the police to gain greater access to valuable information from the community that could lead to the solution and prevention of crimes, and will provide an opportunity for officers to establish a working relationship with the community (Moore, Trojanowicz & Kelling, 1988).

The close alliance forged with the community should not be limited to an isolated incident or series of incidents, nor confined to a specific time frame. The partnership between police and the community must be enduring and balanced. It must break down the old concepts of professional versus civilian, expert versus novice, and authority versus subordinate. The police and the community must be collaborators in the quest to encourage and preserve peace and prosperity. As links between the police and the community are strengthened over time, the ensuing partnership will be better able to pinpoint and mitigate the underlying causes of crime.

**Problem solving**

Problem solving is a broad term that implies more than simply the elimination and prevention of crime. Problem solving is based on the assumption that crime and disorder can be reduced in small geographic areas by carefully studying the characteristics of problems in the area, and then applying the appropriate resources, and on the assumption that individuals make choices based on the opportunities presented by the immediate
physical and social characteristics of an area. By manipulating these factors, people will be less inclined to act in an offensive manner (Eck, 1987).

As police recognize the effectiveness of the problem-solving approach, there is a growing awareness that community involvement is essential for its success. Determining the underlying causes of crime depends, to a great extent, on an in-depth knowledge of community. Therefore, community participation in identifying and setting priorities will contribute to effective problem-solving efforts by the community and the police. Cooperative problem solving also reinforces trust, facilitates the exchange of information, and leads to the identification of other areas that could benefit from the mutual attention of the police and the community.

Goldstein (1990) accentuate that in community policing, the problem-solving process is dependent on input from both the police and the community. Problem solving can involve:

- Eliminating the problem entirely. This type of solution is usually limited to disorder problems, for example, destroying or rehabilitating abandoned buildings that can provide an atmosphere conducive to crime.
- Reducing the number of the occurrences of the problem, for example, drug-dealing and violence will be decreased if the police and the community work together and intensify drug education in schools and churches.
- Improving problem handling. Police should always make an effort to treat people humanely, for example, show sensitivity in dealing rape victims, drug addicts and other related cases.
- Manipulating environmental factors to discourage criminal behavior. This can include collaborative efforts to add better lighting, remove overgrown weeds and seal off vacant and abandoned building.

Creativity and innovation must be fostered if satisfactory solutions to long standing community problems are to be found.
Values

Community policing is ultimately about values. Values must be ingrained in the very culture of the organization and must be reflected in its objectives, in its policies, and in the actions of its personnel. Wasserman & Moore (1988) describe value system as a set of beliefs that guide an organization and the behavior of its employees. The most important beliefs are those that set forth the ultimate purpose of the organization. They provide the organization with its raison d’etre for outsiders and insiders alike and justify the continuing investment in the organization’s enterprise. They influence substantive and administrative decisions facing the organization, they lend a coherent and predictability to top management’s actions and the responses to the actions of employees. This help employees make proper decisions and use their discretion with confidence that they are contributing to rather than detracting from organizational performance.

A clear statement of beliefs and goals gives direction to the organization and helps ensure that values are transformed into appropriate actions and behaviors. In the move to community policing, where problem-solving efforts and accountability are shared by the police, the local government, and the community, explicitly defined values become critically important in assigning responsibility and attracting and mobilizing support and resources.

To endorse the statement of beliefs and goals mentioned above, the Manual for the South African Police (1997) espouse the five core elements of community policing in South Africa were defined as:

- Service orientation: the provision of a professional policing service, responsive to community needs and accountable for addressing these needs;
- Partnership: the facilitation of a co-operative, consultative problem-solving;
- Problem-solving: the joint identification and analysis of the causes of crime and conflict and the development of innovative measures to address these;
- Empowerment: the creation of joint responsibility and capacity for addressing crime;
Accountability: the creation of a culture of accountability for addressing the needs and concerns of communities.

Brown (1989) endorse community policing that relies heavily on the articulation of policing values that incorporate citizen involvement in matters that directly affect the safety and quality of neighborhood life. The culture of the police department therefore becomes one that not only recognizes the merits of community involvement but also seeks to recognize and manage departmental affairs in ways that are consistent with such beliefs.

In light of the above, engagement has been used as a generic, inclusive term to describe the broad range of interaction between people. It can include a variety of approaches, such as one-way communication information delivery, consultation, involvement and collaboration in decision-making, and empowered action in informal groups or formal partnerships.

Research Approach

This pilot study comprising of a combination of surveys and focus group interviews was conducted followed by the designed questionnaire to elicit high response rate. Of the distributed 30 questionnaires, 25 questionnaires were completed and returned. At least 5 questionnaires were not returned at the time of completion of the study. The approach assisted the researcher in also ascertaining whether the existing policy framework governing the Community Police Forums within the SAPS impacts directly or indirectly on the quality of service delivery, sustainability, efficiency and effectiveness of the CPFs.

Findings and Recommendations

This section will discuss the respondents and participants opinions who were interviewed during community policing meetings and stakeholder forums. Observations and participation by the researcher in community policing meetings provided opinions on how the relationship between the SAPS and communities can be improved.
Firstly, political affiliation and allegiance to structures has an effect in the efficiency and effectiveness of C.P.F., operations. Because of the past relationship between the police and the communities, communities lack knowledge of the role and functions of the police. This may hamper the function of the forum and the involvement of the community in the forum. The police may also feel that the forum and community interfere with their functioning. It is therefore important to gain insight into the matter.

According to Pelser (1999), institutional capacity is a major challenge and whether the police are really able to engage in the innovative practices required to revitalize or empower communities. Given the severe capacity constraints facing the police organization, the availability of such capacity may be even more questionable. Pelser (1999) further espouse the constraints facing S.A.P.S., as an organization as follows: Secondly, the hierarchical organization of personnel inhibits individual innovation and that the S.A.P.S., may well be the one and only police agency in which there are more ranked members than constables, more managers than managed. Extremely top-heavy and centralized, the S.A.P.S., has delegated very limited actual management authority to its local level operational command, the station commanders. This is, of course the level of command that is meant to engage and deal creatively with the concerns of local residents.

Thirdly, the continuing lack of a coherent and integrated training, deployment, development and succession strategy geared towards enhancing local service delivery means that there are no systematic incentives for rewarding innovative and effective practice at the local level.

The other constraint is the personnel of the S.A.P.S., which is still largely undertrained and under skilled with more members who never received formal training in the actual methodology of community policing.

Brogden & Shearing (1994) argues that the measures used to encourage the tainted to leave mainly with lucrative packages applied across the organization also encouraged some of the brightest and the best who were qualified for and confident of making it outside the police to leave. This has arguably left the police without the sound management
cadre required to drive the transformation of policing practice required by community policing.

There are some cases where communities withdraw from the C.P.F., and function independently. The distance between some of the communities and C.P.F., as an obstacle to a collaborative, integrated, coordinated and multi partnership approach to crime prevention. Some of the reasons provided by the community members were that the CPFs are non-functional, aligned to political parties, law unto themselves, lack of resources and largely interfere in police matters. It is however, important that both the C.P.F., S.A.P.S., and disgruntled community members find common ground and co-operate in order to serve and provide and efficient and effective community policing service.

Pelser (1999) explores these challenges in some details, suggesting that marginalized groups will be very reluctant to become involved and may become increasingly disadvantaged by community policing which works better in wealthier areas. Although the logic of community policing assumes the availability of inherent community resources such as social capital which may be tapped and enhanced to produce social order, very often such groups have, in practice, limited resources to offer. 

The end goal is the creation of a professional, representative, responsive, and accountable institution that works in partnership with the community. Achieving these goals requires taking action to improve on the individual, institutional and societal values. The management structure capable of embedding and sustaining the values and competency must be created.

However, the researcher settles for contributions by Groenewald & Peake (2004) with regards to the lessons learnt and challenges impacting on community policing, namely:

- Variable quality and insufficient quantity of implementers
Often there is a dramatic variance in experience, skills, and training among community policing members. Quality control remains a problem as many missions and activities have difficulty in finding sufficient numbers of adequately trained personnel.

- **Poor Coordination**

There is still insufficient coordination between the various implementing agencies that undertake police reform and activities. The absence of coordinated planning results in poorly designed programming which does not fit with other initiatives.

- **Too little evaluation**

There remains limited knowledge about what works and what does not in community policing. Evaluation has yet to be adequately mainstreamed into program design and certain challenges of evaluation remain on the most appropriate and realistic benchmarks and indicators for measuring progress.

- **Inadequate funding**

There is a profound disconnect between the goals and values that reformers are trying to promote and the levels of funding provided to effect this change. Donor interest tends to wane before sufficient time has passed to produce tangible results.

- **Institutional resistance**

The operational culture of a police force must be addressed as police are often characterized as resistant to change and distrustful of outsiders. Changes in philosophy and approach will be difficult to infuse throughout an organization where there is reluctance at the level of the individual.

**Conclusion**

Community policing is, in essence, collaboration between the police and the community that identifies and solves community problems. With the police no longer the sole guardians of law and order, all members of the community become active allies in the
effort to enhance the safety and quality of neighborhoods. Community policing has far-reaching implications, hence, creating a constructive partnership will require energy, creativity, understanding and patience of all involved.

The term community engagement broadly captures public processes in which the general public and other interested parties are invited to contribute to particular proposals or policy changes. Community engagement has the potential to go beyond merely making information available or gathering opinion and attitudes. It entails a more active exchange of information and viewpoints between the sponsoring organization and the public. Reinvigorating communities is essential if we are to deter crime and create more vital neighborhoods. In some communities, it will take time to break down barriers of apathy and mistrust so that meaningful partnership can be forged. Trust is the value that underlies and links the components of community partnership and problem-solving. A foundation of trust will allow police to form close relationships with the community that will produce solid achievements. Without trust between police and citizens, effective policing is impossible.

To assess the future of community policing, the South African Police Service must look to where they have been as an organization so as to understand where they are going through evaluation of the organizational success and failures. Community policing will continue to change as communities change and it is from within those communities that real or perceived problems will evolve.

Finally, the most appropriate goal for the next decade is to give communities the training they need to take the lead in problem solving. Maybe it is time to educate and empower community residents so that they are the ones who approach the police to join them.

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The Degree of Decentralization of Indonesia: A Comparison of the Two Regimes

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Abstract

In accordance with the historic route, decentralization in Indonesia experiencing fluctuations depending on the mood of spiritual power from time to time. In that time, the decentralization policy is applied based on several governance systems. Pattern of application performed well in limited or broad based on the needs of the Government. The very quick government circulation on each period resulted in the decentralization policy looks ‘float and sink’ if not left then move on to the centralization. With a short duration so then to the implementation of Act No. 5 of 1974 about The Points of Government in The Region, decentralization policy as like as hiding behind the ‘armpit’ dizziness of Central Government for applying it widely and responsible. These conditions resulting in decentralization policy hard known how degrees its implementations then it easier to identify any problems related to lay policy in a balanced in relationship central and local. Degree of decentralization is measure which can be made for comparing standards whether a country is more decentralist or otherwise. Domestically Degree of decentralization as size or standard for comparing are at the rate of decentralization implementation applied to appropriate goals, program, and actual activities.

Understandably, during the period of application of the decentralization until the regime of Act No. 22 of 1999 and No. 32 of 2004 about Local Governments, which look is the spirit of change in the terminology of revision over how to increase the degree of decentralization. If the Central Government reasoned that no qualified processing such large powers that are submitted, the region holds its own center was not consistent in
preparing all the required instruments so that gap looks is not merely the failure of local government.

In the middle tensions of the creative that Center on purpose do ‘changed-embroidery’ on a note of compromise by the local Government Association/for the local government, all the changes of decentralization mechanisms by the Central Government is not simply change the cover, but politically suspect wants re-centralization. The important question for us is whether the high degree of decentralization can minimize the relative Center so authorities interfere with the relationship of regional centers in the framework of the unitary State? In fact, the regional authority internally in Indonesia assessed ‘too much and too soon’\(^8\) so that the mechanisms of State should tend to smell the practice of federalism. To see trends that may need to know how big the degree of decentralization in Indonesia after the implementation of the following policies before.\(^9\)

This section will describe the degree of decentralization of the eight main aspects, namely how many functions are devolved, type of delegation, control, authority of financial management, capabilities of the legislation, the level of dependency, area of service, as well as the local party’s role in articulating the interests of the community. The degree of decentralization of Indonesia will only compare the last two practices regime implemented since 1999 and in 2004. Externally the degree of decentralization of Indonesia can be used to measure how serious decentralization runs than other countries that are being, and have been running that policy.


\(^9\) Act No. 32/2004 assessed as a result of the revision of Act No. 22/1999 about Local Government which is the starting point of history the most fundamental policies of decentralization in Indonesia. However, it should be understood that the history of decentralization policies in Indonesia has begun since the Act. No. 1/1945, which impressed more liberal in which under certain conditions may not only not making own decisions in financial management but can print its own money. For this history can be referenced on Kompilasi Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah dan Sekilas Proses Kelahirannya (1903-2004), Kerjasama *Institute of Local Development-Yayasan Tifa*, Jakarta, 2004.
The higher the degree of decentralization is at least a strong correlation to the extent of the degree of democracy running on a country. Doubts, stagnation, failure, excessive fear as even as experienced by a number of countries that are running at least a decentralization policy is a valuable lesson to strengthen efforts towards democracy.

About The Size of Decentralization

Without forgetting entirely the debate over the concept and theory of decentralization, the thing that is often overlooked is how to know the degree of decentralization in the practice of governance in the region. Measurement of the degree of decentralization in a country is at least useful for evaluating the development of decentralization in comparative quality of decentralized domestic and inter-State externally. Nevertheless, the question of measuring the degree of decentralization is not an easy thing sebagaimana dikatakan James Fesler (Smith 1985).10

It is caused by at least three important things, namely language terminology for this mendikotomi our minds about centralization and decentralization, as well as the question of how to distinguish between areas of decentralization in a country. Regardless of the degree of decentralization can drawn up based on certain factors while leaving the debate.

These factors, among others; the first as far as which function or Affairs are run by local governments. The more function or Affairs submitted the higher degree of decentralization. The first factor points with regard to the extent of the powers transferred by the Central Government to the regions. Politically a great authority allows the able develop his household independently, creative and innovative. The freedom that became an important element of the authority in question allows the area can dig the ability itself through processes that are democratic in order to achieve the greatest possible welfare for the peoples in the region. Administratively great local lets authority able to give service the

best in terms of what is needed by the community through the principles of efficiency and effectiveness

Economically large authority allows the able explore resources available for real and responsible. Culturally great authority allows the area can develop tradition that undercurrent of new order uniformities policy so that people in the area have self-esteem and strengthen the bargaining position in the presence of the Central Government.

The second factor concerns the type of delegation of functions. In this case, there are two types of delegation of functions of the general competence and ultra-vires doctrine. General competence allows the can develop maximally capabilities beyond what the central authorities. Instead, ultra-vires doctrine authorized limited areas where a certain functions defined explicitly by the Central Government. The first type tends to be practiced in the State of federalist, while the second type of reference in many a country shaped unity. In the development of this second type of delegation that functions is often performed by several countries in combinative.

The third factor relates to how much central control over local governments. The repressive nature of the controls gives the opportunity to the local governments to foster self-reliance, creativity, and innovation before the intervention Center. Instead, the preventive control is viewed not give odds on the local Government to develop self-reliance, creativity and innovation through the intervention Center. As such controls are assessed more repressive encourages decentralized preventive controls than degrees.

The fourth factor relates to the decision-making authority regarding financial management good acceptance and Government spending area. The higher the discretion decision making in terms of financial allocation, which is based on the real needs of local government increasingly higher degree of decentralization. In the context of this comparison is performed with emphasis on discretion decide not just based on how big the transferred financial center to the area.
The fifth factor is correlation by the method of formation of the autonomous region (regional government). Method of formation of the autonomous region, which took place in a bottom up shows, the degree of decentralization is higher than if the initiation of the establishment of the autonomous region took place in a top down. These factors have a strong relevance to the degree of democracy where the participation of the community to be the deciding factor rather than the interests of the political elite alone.

The sixth factor is how much the local Government's financial dependence on the Central Government. These factors will see how big the financial appropriations beyond the Government’s original revenue areas. The higher revenue than the original allocation of Central Government assistance in various mechanisms designed the higher degree of decentralization.

The seventh factor related to the coverage area of service. The more extensive the coverage area of Ministry is seen the higher degree of decentralization. Although these factors have weaknesses but also must known how big the domination the Center in a number of Affairs undertaken during this time. The areas that have the particularity of geographic, topographic, demographic, sociological, historical, and politically possible to solve the problem specifically and limiting government intervention.

The eighth factor is related to the role of local political parties in the articulate community interests in the region than the national political party domination. The higher discretion of local party in reflecting the needs of the community by means of the available legislation increasingly higher degree of decentralization. Among the eight factors that can be used in determining the degree of decentralization in a country, the first two factors are often, the main concern as he said Conyers (1986).11

Further in terms of the distribution of the authority he needs to pay attention to a number of things, namely, the functional activity of what devolved, what came to be

attached to the functions referred to, how much power at every level, to whom the distribution function are given, as well as regarding way such as whether the function and powers of the devolved.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{The Degree of Decentralization of Two Regimes}

The policy decentralization in Indonesia, basically, is as old as the formation of the Republic of Indonesia since 1945. However, whenever decentralization is applied on certain period appears to be ‘growing but wither before it blossom out’\textsuperscript{13}. The top problem with no way out faced at the end of each regime forming an accumulation of disappointment over all authority given so far. Every regime argued that decentralization is not directly proportional to the set expectations for accomplishing policy objectives of decentralization itself.

The degree of decentralization that is too large to make the Center as if losing control guaranteeing permanent integration of power. All indications of deviation that make the Center feel frustrating to lose the way out (way out) pushed the policy change (revised) as the easiest answer to a variety of demands and the dynamics of the areas judged no longer a rational as well as smells of separatism. This symptom if not controlled soon, according to the Center to be the forerunner for the formation of seeds of disintegration of the nation. Although the classic reason that has been broken by a number of experts answer, but the issue remaining when the Center lost solutions in control of policy decentralization that began overlapping.

According to some observers of the decentralization is thus the most appropriate response to the helplessness of this area during depending the policies of the Central Government. Practical, decentralization can be the answer and decide about the

\textsuperscript{12} Muluk, Khairul, 2006, \textit{Desentralisasi Pemerintahan Daerah}, Bayumedia, Jakarta, hal. 18-22.

disintegration of a nation’s true integration. The thing is how big is the degree of decentralization given the Center so that the regions actually have the ability to develop Bylaws independently, creative and innovative.

On the other corner of the region feel disappointed because discretion had assessed the extent of the new suction thumb. Many times the policy decentralization is applied as if not led to satisfactory results if not returned to the system implementation with one reason; the area has not been able to carry out decentralization itself. The indication can be demonstrated by looking at the high level of dependence on the Government Center; area is the reason why the region as long as it is failed to achieve independence.\(^{14}\)

Until the end of 2004 all the powers that be in broad principle, real and responsible votes was nothing more than a set of instruments half empty if don’t want to say half-day. It must be admitted since 1999 Indonesia’s decentralization policy has actually entered a new chapter, which is more fundamental. Apart from that in the euphoria of the wait all the puff commitment Center bubbling up the entire contents of the authority unless it concerns the national interests of the policy changes the Center cannot seriously raise the degree of decentralization, but executes re-centralization Then, how is the degree of decentralization of Indonesia until the period of application of the regime of local governance in 2004?

Two local governance regimes that represents the policy of decentralizing Indonesia’s Regional Government Act. No.22/1999 and no. 32 in 2004. Both these regimes have significant differences in characteristics and its implications. The first regime born of antithesis the failure of the policies of the new order by Act No. 5 /1974 concerning Basic Staple of Government in the implementation of national character.

The outbreak of the reformation in 1998 prompted the birth of a number of events including the autonomous region not only failed to address the issue of the disintegration of the nation as well. The first regime (1999) there are a prominent feature of the current

\(^{14}\) A very high of local dependent of financial (90%) in case of decentralization policy application in Act No. 22/1948 as continuance of Act. No. 1/1945 was evidence that made Central back into centralistic policy.
democratization rise though the mechanism of recruitment of officials at the local level still running indirect (indirect election)/other characteristics is emphasizing autonomy put on the most direct contact with the community that is the County and city. An autonomous system is widely applied and real, is not cascading as well as principled no mandate without let.

On the two regimes (2004) as a correction over the weakness of the first regime have different characters which change the basic organization of the governance as the fourth amendment constitutional mandate, the change mechanism of the direct election of regional heads (direct election), the principle of autonomy is not only real, but also responsible, narrowing the powers become more rigid in the Affairs of the pattern of mandatory and optional affair, as well as the inception of the principles of the management authority of externalities, accountability and efficiency. Without discussing the further implications of both drives change issues so far in three separate regimes of local governance, electoral districts, and the Government of the village, we will only describe two degrees of decentralization through the comparison of the two regimes.

First, the number of functions devolved from the Centre for this region can be seen in the application of two local governance regimes. Since 1999, the devolved authority covers all things except regarding national interest such as defense, security, financial, judicial, religious, and foreign relations. All authority out five things of yesteryear into the Affairs of local governance that can be arranged and taken care of based on the autonomy of the region. Without enough restrictions on the extent of the authority given in the end, quite the hassle of local government at once gives rise to anxiety.

The culmination of these failures prompted the industry to a revision of the policy of decentralization since 2004 due to the need for direct and straighten out the policy is that the more prepared and mature. Two things that should be noted is the first addition to the authority concerned, the overall national interests as stated in the policy of the decentralization in 1999 has been converted toward administrative decentralization the effect of in-efficiency than political one. Concretely, all of local authority change into local
affairs that total 31 kind of affairs (16 absolute affairs and the others is concurrent affairs). Here the authority of local government was decreased from the only blank form that before they can to fill that as easy as they want, but now it becomes more detail affairs and must be responsible. Second, from 2004 the decentralization policy more cleared “the other authority” that means by two regimes. The another authority explained into national development planning and controlling in macro scoup, balancing budget fund, public administration system, guidance of human resources, strategic technology, conservation and national standardization.

At first glance the decentralization policy in 2004 enforced to discipline the local government authority that now accepted as a bunch when implementation of decentralization in 1999 that saw as “the most great full”. But if compared to the two regimes implementation, they can explained that by the decentralization aspect of delegation function degree until now has been decreased although the reasons of government can tolerance by public.

Second, since the implementation of decentralization policy in 1999 the type of the delegation fiction implemented based on general competence. Here local government expected to expand the capability in exploration and exploitation the provided resource for people welfare. General authority is determined as everything that given by the central government that must be managed maximally for the local society interest as far as not resist the higher laws. Beside of the five government prime authority, actually the local has a proper general competence to manage their own affairs. The Management of local affairs, at least has three basic authorities, they are policy making, financial management and apparatus resources management.

As far as implementation of decentralization policy in 1999, the policy making authority in term of rule and management in local get a lot of opportunities with the limited by higher regulation, multilevel authority, and public interest. Also for authority in managing the budget that giving the freedom of action for local to approve and spend according to necessarily. In official sector, local can promote, mutation, even demote their
official until some position depend on interest of regime that hold the power. Until the implementation of revision decentralization policy in 2004, the local authority in decision making limited by preventive term.

More than 1500 local regulations until years 2011 canceled before implemented by the local government. The greater part of local regulation is accumulate by the product of policy when the implementation of decentralization policy in 1999. Authority in establishing budget sector is also decrease after before local was indicated to easy to spend money for the consumptive reason and interest. Until year 2004 the corruption level in legislative and executive increase specifically personal and collective manner. Internal conflict in the official sector caused by bureaucratic politicization that raised the top since year 2005 when the mechanism to elect the head of local government in direct election.

Decentralization policy in 2004 actually has a purpose to decrease access the authority overlapping although as far as the limited of these problems are not directly solving the problem. Authority problem is include the earth, water, and natural resources that should be under controlled by nation but the fact, it is being to space competition for every government levels. Decentralization degree by aspect of authority for mining and earth gas it is moved slowly into central authority although in some limited it will be back on local government. During the degree of decentralization in managing the budget sector is also deficit as response by straighten the corruption in every sector.

In official scope decentralization degree just change for a few positions from permission in the lowest level being the authority by the highest level (Regency/city to province). Generally the decentralization degree from the kind of delegation function factor since the assembling in 2004 compare with 1999 has decreased although these the decentralization degree corrected according the consideration and reasoning from the government.

Third, since the decentralization regime in 2004 disposed preventive control has increased as access assembling decentralization regime in 1999. In these years more control held by repressive that can give a chance to local government to make a lot of policy
although finally caused the overlapping and conflict of authority. According to the last explanation, until the middle of 2012 thousand local regulation canceled by central government in same time with the preventive control kind in province or in central government level. It must be said although, the assembly of decentralization in 1999 makes the impact by raising the overlapping and controversial, but increase of preventive control since assembly of decentralization in 2004 makes the decentralization degree for the factor also decreased.

Control change that held by government for much of decentralization policy in local should not limit the local activity to expand the autonomy, but in every side of local government shows like limited themselves. Practical indication that can show unwilling a few of bureaucratic become a budgeting official caused by tight of rules, regulation, consequence, and pressure from higher position. Once more this decentralization degree has decreased without questioned the reason of government to change the policy that may be can be understand. A lot of instrument was marked by the central government to control the taste of local consumptive that has imprinted so easy to spend their money without a clarity responsibility. Although the government every year has effort to add the local financial allocation, but in cumulative local was imprinted not enough faced on to much the affairs that decentralized.

Actually the allocation of central budget still higher than local fund with 70:30 of percentages. The problem is how important the central government must change their budget for local government if they consider about a lot of affairs that’s given to local government with the parallel term should change the balance of financial as like as the principle that No Mandate Without Funding? if there is will be base of indicator between local and central fund, the opportunity more balance if not give the profit to the local government. The problem of the relationship between local and central government must accept to become the main obstacle in every country. This problem also connecting with the government commitment like bureaucratic reformation that not consistent until now to carry out these commitment.
These phenomena show that the decentralization degree was decreased when the changing of financial management mechanism affects decreases of absorbing fund every year. This problem also shows that local government seems stagnant from their creativity and innovation caused by tight of limit for central government in managing budget sector. More tight the expenditure of local budget it is caused by a lot of the corruption phenomena in the local government that also showed by Ministry of Home Affairs.

Fifth, local legislation determining for every local regulation product since 1999 was increased significantly. There is no central intervention in decision making except for border area and transfer of asset. So many local regulation not eligible especially about legality and substance aspect it caused by low capacity and capability of local legislative. The other reason is the weak of decentrazation especially for the candidate of local legislator. This condition has changed after reformation regime in 2004 by decentralization policy that make strong refreshed authority for province and central government. Intervention will show for local regulation after evaluation if contained by contra productive with decentralization policy and national interest.

According the data by Financial Ministry of Republic of Indonesia, until 2009 there are 2,779 local regulations has canceled. Most of the regulation is not supported for investigation especially in transportation sector (427 regulations), trade and industry (365 regulations), agriculture (340 regulations), forestry (288 regulations). For this factor must be accepted that decentralization degree has decreased although the government reason in term of intervention more supportive in forming the qualified local regulations, but until now local legislative not much give an initiation excepted waiting for suggestions by the local government. The function of local legislation is not productive to make the local regulations. Local legislative seems barren of their function, where the local legislative is a part of local government instrument.

Sixth, dependence level of local government and central budgeting establish the decentralization degree. In fact, the level of local government more dependence to the central budgeting than local income itself that should be foundation of decentralization
developing that can controlled by the source of local fund there are general allocation fund, special allocation fund, and balance fund. Increasing of percentages for all of local fund sources has average about 0.5-2 percent per years. While local expenditure always increase in 125 local authorities until 60-70 % every year (data from MOHA:2012). In 2005 for apparatus expenditure increase until 70% in some of local government (example: Bitung City, Palu City, Amon City, Sragen Regency and Tasikmalaya). According to Forum Indonesia transparence Anggaran (FITRA), until 2011 from 124 local authorities, Lumajang Regency has spent apparatus expenditure until 83% from the total budget and local cost. For while the contribution of local income has an average only about 2-10% from the total budget that has given from central government.

Illogically, although some local autonomy since the implementation of decentralization policy in 2004 get more additional affect caused by new resources of mining and gas sector, but the level of local dependence still increasing beside until now the new local autonomy increasingly more and more since 1999 when the decentralization policy has implemented. Until the last of June 2012, there is 19 candidates of new local autonomy that has gotten their permission and recommendation from central government to established to new regency, city and province. Because of that, the prediction for two years later the new local autonomy will be increasingly more and more. The increasingly of local autonomy until 2007 can be showed by this table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Regency/City</th>
<th>Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 17th 1945</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8 Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967-1975 (8 years)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26 Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-1999 (24 years)</td>
<td></td>
<td>27 Province</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-2007 (8 years)</td>
<td>173 City/ Regency</td>
<td>32 Province</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: from many source, 2012

These data shows that increasingly of new local autonomy for regency and city increased significantly during 62 years. In average about 3 months has established 1
regency/city. Whereas the province as local autonomy increase the last 8 years to 5 province. This condition showing that beside the government cannot restructure in central or local government is also directly increasingly the level of local dependence. But, some of local autonomy like East Java Province, Central Java Province, and South Sulawesi showing the better prospect beside 10 regencies and 10 cities that get enough predicate about productivity of government in 2012.

With this indication, the decentralization degree from dependence fund factor doesn’t show the advance that was caused by expanding the local government need except the expansion of new local autonomy. Out of those cases, it must be accepted that any local autonomy that can get the high appreciate as mainstay of local autonomy success in Indonesia, although it can’t be representative of decentralization degree improvement generally.

Seventh, the extensive of local government area can establish the decentralization degree. The reason is with these authorities local government more capable to solve any problems with effective and efficient. Extensive of local government area shows the local government duties that more extensive these area, it could be more less the central intervention. Although since 1999 extensive and service was held with fuse terms, but the service principles that directly included with the other local affairs doesn’t clear ruled by the regulation that can make more hard to establish the decentralization degree. The problem is, is it true that the extensive of area and the decentralization can held by local government? In fact, so many authority and affairs that given to local government doesn’t optimize yet. When the decentralization era in 2004, the principle of authority management has fixed by externality, accountability and efficiency. These principles become a basic of problem solving about health, education, border, garbage, mining, and connection each autonomy area that should be common affairs. The principle that contained by this policy is not only giving the corridor for local government but also give these easier mechanism especially for the mechanism of connecting each local autonomy service. The affairs that’s given to local government divided by two clusters, they are the
obligation affairs, and the optional affairs. Beside that they also do the concurrent affairs that can held by two entities of different government.

If the degree of decentralization in this factor viewed by the aspect of local capability to solve their problem with the extension of area and more less the central intervention, so can concluded that the decentralization degree in period of 2004 is higher than 1999. In 1999 the local government has area scope and authority in public service but in fact so many affairs can’t be realized properly. Although to slow but in 2004 local more capable to solve their problem especially for the cross-sector after the central government establish the principles of authority management for each local government or each level of government entity. It Should be realized that the role of central government just to make the mechanism clearer of authority management that until now become the main obstacle that couldn't be mentioned as intervention.

Eighth, the last factor related to the domination of local party could articulate the interest than the intervention of national party. Outside Nangroe Aceh Darussalam Province that has local party, all of local government has hierarchy structure from national party. The local party in local area is continuation of national party in national scope. Generally the policy of national party centralize become a hierarchy to branch in local area. The effect all of party policy in local area always depend on policy of national party. Although the national party was given the authority to local party but the articulation in legislative generally hasn’t reflected the interest of local society, accepted the elite interest of local party itself.

In the case in the local election, all the candidate that will be compete as head of local government must get permission from elite party in national level. Without written recommendation from CEO of national party, the candidate is hard to continue their process to be elected in local election. It shows that the role of local party in representation the voice of local society has still dominated by national party. In decentralization regime 1999 or 2004, the productivity of local party was not fully successful but just accept the C
Conclusion

From these factors, it can be concluded that the decentralization degree in two regimes that reflected the decentralization policy in Indonesia since 1999 until implementation in the next regime in 2004 has declined although there is some factors not change or more increase specifically. It could understand that the decentralization degree is like as independence for local government to manage their affairs expansively in a boundary system of Republic of Indonesia. But if the decentralization degree accepted as the government effort to intensification the quality of local government that these right to manage their affairs is more important than to reach the goals of decentralization itself, so it also should accepted that the decentralization degree has relative increasing although in quantitatively method of the decentralization degree has decreased.

It also shows that the regime change purposed to increase the decentralization degree from the quality of local autonomy aspect, not only the quantity that showed by the local orientation in every competition affairs. If these cases can be understood by central government, local government, and local legislative, so the problem of dynamic of decentralization directly can be accepted as long as the purpose to increase the quality of local autonomy.

In this context, important to socialize the concept and the policy to change the perception of elite in local as same as concluded by Hidayat (2007:410) by many education and training that was held by Sekolah Tinggi Pemerintahan Dalam Negeri (Now IPDN) in terms of training of local autonomy for the member of local legislative during 2001-2003. If the decentralization degree is connected to the democratization, so it can be explained that the democracy in Indonesia still in the qualification processes from the quantity that has happened in the decentralization regime in 1999. The decentralization degree seems like a paradoxical with the effort to increase the efficiency and central control. This conclusion reminds us about the dilemma of democracy, that higher of our orientation of the effort to reach the quality of democracy, the effect of in-efficiency become higher. On the contrary
higher of our orientation in efficiency, our effort to reach the quality of our democracy become lesser.

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Kompilasi Undang-Undang Otonomi Daerah dan Sekilas Proses Kelahirannya (1903-2004), Kerjasama Institute For Local Development- Yayasan Tifa, Jakarta, 2004
Local Administration of Education in Lampang Province

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Abstract

The objective of this paper is to recommend development of a curriculum for basic education to the local administration organizations (LAO) in Lampang Province, in the north of Thailand. The data on which this paper was based came from secondary sources, such as previous research findings, and in-depth interviews with 53 persons who were in charge of education in both the public and private sectors. The schools in the province had to adopt the central curriculum developed by the Ministry of Education, which was not suitable for the pupils in the local areas. Based on this study, it is recommended that a new curriculum needs to be developed specifically for students in Lampang Province. This new curriculum should be more relevant to and integrated with local needs, while maintaining clear objectives. To achieve these goals, a network management model, which allows all stakeholders to participate in all management functions, should be adopted.

Keywords: Education Management, Participation Local Curriculum

Introduction

15 Lampang Province abuts Chiang Mai province, among others. Its main city, Lampang, is approximately 100 km southeast of the city of Chiang Mai.
Education is a public service and a key factor in a country's efforts to increase the abilities of the population and the competitiveness of the nation as a whole (Michael L., 2010; Hargreaves, A. & Goodson, I. (2006); Hill, P. & Crevola, C. (1999); Krueger, A. & Lindahl, M. (2000); P. Sahlberg (2006))

Thus, leaders of developed countries give high priority to education and policies to improve or reform education (George P., & Harry Anthony P., (2004); Michael P., (2001)). Thailand is no difference in this regard, in that past governments have tried to improve the quality of Thai public education (Reform Council, 2012). Despite these efforts, Thailand still ranks quite low on the global scale, at 78 out of 144 countries and, among ASEAN member countries, Thailand ranks 8th for educational competence of its students (World Economic Forum, 2013). Therefore, it is imperative that Thailand raises the standard of its public education.

In the past, education reform was primarily the purview of the Ministry of Education (MOE). However, Thailand launched a decentralization policy and program for education (Article 49 of the 2007 Constitution) and planned to devolve authority to local administration organizations (LAO) to tailor education to the local needs and context (Articles 41 and 42 of the 1999 National Education Act). However, it can be asserted that, at present, Thailand has not progressed that far in the education sector. Further, LAOs still do not have the requisite authority for basic education and they do not play a significant role in educational reform. Previous studies have shown that LAOs essentially administer education according to the framework and policy of the central education authorities. Thus, the LAO is limited in its ability to support educational reform and improve the curriculum so that it is more suited to the local context.

This limitation has an impact on children in remote rural areas and reduces the opportunity to acquire the essential education for success in local occupations and livelihoods. Despite the significant differences in economies, societies and cultures around Thailand, students in basic education have to study from the same standardized curriculum. This creates a gap in knowledge that the students are able to apply to local situations. This partly reflects the central administration's disdain for the periphery (Pintawanit, 2000). Thus, a number of scholars have advocated for community-based
education to help students to better understand local problems and needs (Technical Department, 2001). This will give students the tools to create a higher quality of life and to be more productive members of society and have greater fulfillment, by applying the knowledge directly to the home community (Cherykiwong, U., 2002). By implementing, local administration of education, in collaboration with related sectors in the local area, we should be able to create a more practical educational curriculum for a given context (Chairat, P., 2002; Chompulong, N., 1999).

LAOs are an extension of the central government which is most proximal to the people of the country. Thus, the MOE should seek to collaborate more with these LAOs in educational reforms. This will also increase local participation in education policy, implementation and accountability, which should produce a higher quality and more efficient system of learning (Kingpawong, P. & Wongpreedee, A., 2013).

**Objectives of this study**

Since the LAOs are closest to the local population, the roles and responsibilities of administering basic education at the local level should be devolved to them. Though decentralization of authority for education management is not yet complete, the LAOs are certain to have an increased role in this sector in the future. There needs to be research studies to explore models and characteristics of curricula for basic education which the LAO and local communities feel are appropriate. This experience can serve as a guideline for teaching and learning.

**Limitations of the study**

This study is limited in terms of geographic scope and range of content and concepts. This study was conducted in Lampang Province and among only seven schools under the administration of the local LAO. These include one school under the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) and six schools under the Lampang Municipality. This study focused only on content defined in the educational reform recommendations for
2009-2018 to improve the quality of education through multi-sectoral collaboration at all levels.

Methodology

This was a qualitative study, and data were collected by review of existing documentation and by in-depth interviews with key informants, including 39 relevant staff of the LAOs (e.g., Chief Executive of the PAO, Mayor of Lampang Municipality, Director of the PAO Office of Education, Religion and Culture, Director of the Municipal Education Office, school headmasters, and school board members of the seven schools). School board members include local leaders, monks, representatives of parents of students, and alumni. In-depth interviews were also conducted with one teacher from each of the seven schools, and stakeholders, for an additional 14 respondents. Altogether, 53 key informants participated in the study.

Primary and secondary data were subjected to content analysis and the results synthesized into core findings and a summary. The focus was on community-based education through collaboration of the LAOs, the schools and the local community. Recommendations are provided for educational reform through LAO administration.

Results

The reader should understand that this research was conducted after calls for educational reform, beginning in 1997 and increasing in intensity of the intervening years. There was increasing concern that the sub-standard quality of Thai education was giving rise to unfavorable developments and crises in society. The constitution of 1997 called for a law specific to education to produce genuine reform, and this process began in 1999 with the Education Act (amended in 2003 and 2010). The first reform framework addressed the period of 1999-2008. A review of accomplishments found some successes, but many challenges remained, especially in the area of quality of students, teachers and educational administrators (Office of the Education Council, 2009). This led to a revised “Round 2”
framework for the period from 2009-2018. This framework has three goals: To develop the quality and standards of education of Thais; to increase educational opportunity for all; and, most importantly, support for greater participation of all sectors in educational administration under the core principles of education reform (quality development for the population, administrators, teachers, students and schools in the new era) (Office of the Education Council, 2009).

Given these favorable legal and policy developments, the researchers were interested in the local perspective of the status and challenges of education after reforms had begun. On paper, the LAO has the authority and responsibility to manage education to match local needs. However, almost all respondents in this study acknowledged that, traditionally, administration of education was concentrated in the central ministry and departments. Thus, the further from Bangkok, the less relevant the curriculum, the more the quality of education suffered, and the more that local needs were left unmet, resulting in social problems.

Indeed, even at present, educational policy and management is still concentrated at the central authorities. The concept of school-based management means that more authority is devolved to the school in administering education, but this is still only theoretical and has not been put to the test in the Thai context. The related concept of local community involvement in curriculum design, education management and evaluation (i.e., “Education for All and All for Education”) is still only theoretical, in that the MOE will not relinquish central control of the process, content, and assessment. Central control saps local motivation to improve or become more self-reliant.

A quality education should enable Thais to do the following: (1) Share their knowledge, skills and wisdom as part of their occupation and daily life, on a foundation of local resources and environment; (2) Share the quality beliefs and values that are unique to each locality, and which should be sustained; and (3) Acquire learning, and share experiences with others in the community regarding their livelihood, and in addressing local problems and needs. Instead, the current format of public education seems to want to push young Thais on the same pathway toward the capital or large urban centers. This
makes the rural areas feel abandoned and, without adequate human resources, it is hard for them to develop the local community.

“Education for All” is not just a nice-sounding slogan of UNESCO, but must become a reality for all Thai citizens. This vision implies that all Thais have the right to a quality education. But the respondents in this study went further, and feel that there must be a sense of community ownership of the education challenge, and not view it as something imposed from the outside, and especially not by the MOE alone. It is clear that LAOs, whose area of administration encompasses virtually all Thai households in the country, must play a more central role in promoting community-based education management. The main obstacle is the refusal by the Bureaucratic Polity to relinquish control and, in particular, the education budget. This is consistent with the ideas of Fred Riggs (1966) who viewed that this obstacle will be hard to overcome.

Respondents were asked what they thought would be the defining features of a basic education curriculum tailored to the Lampang context. The response was genuinely uniform in that the process of reforming education must go hand-in-hand with reform of teachers, students, and educational media. They recognize that this is a major challenge. If the push for community-based management is too strong or too fast, it could backfire by putting even more authority and control in the hands of the MOE. Nevertheless, the respondents felt that tailoring parts of the basic education curriculum is a start to the reform process and would be allowed to expand if proven effective. The case for a locally-driven curriculum includes the need to preserve the traditional culture and wisdom of sub-regions of the country, which still provide an important foundation for learning, unity, and even modern technology. The other argument for localization is ‘socialization’ of the new generation so that they are well-prepared to be productive citizens and an important resource for future national development.

Nearly all of the respondents in this study felt that most of the local population would like to see a basic education curriculum that is tailored to the local context. Each community has a different resource basis, for example, in terms of the local wisdom. Each community would like to see these unique aspects reflected in the local schools for their practical application and as a means of preserving hard-earned local wisdom for future
generations. Respondents also observed that any local curriculum needs to have built-in flexibility, so that it can be easily adapted to suit changing local imperatives and rapid social change. But there needs to be retention of the core traditions and values that unite and bond the community, as it pertains to their lifestyle, livelihoods, culture, norms, and wisdom.

At present, it is clear that many of the traditional ways and trades are vanishing as urbanization and modern technology spread. Fewer young people have the interest or motivation to carry on the community traditions. The local culture and dialects are also being lost to posterity, as central norms become the standard. Lampang Province is home to the ethnic people of the ‘Tai Lua’ population, which is still holding its traditions together. But these traditions are eroding with each new generation due to permanent out-migration and influx of urban practices. The Lua dialect is similar to the ancient Lanna language, and the new generation needs to know this in order to prevent its extinction. The young should know about and respect their roots and the history of how they came to be. It is impossible for a central, standard curriculum to accommodate all these local variations and cultural treasures. Instead, the central curriculum seems to be more about promoting nationalism and reinforcing a uniform sense of Thai-ness among the people in all parts of the country. This is causing the new generation to feel cut off from the past, and they may find it hard to relate to elderly parents and grandparents. Furthermore, the centrally-driven curriculum, by definition, negates the role of local participation since it is essentially a top-down mechanism and structure of enforcement.

Any educational reform movement in Thailand must be built upon a foundation of strong communities who want to be self-reliant. This will require a new paradigm and conceptual thinking. In the first instance, the government needs to create and promote an enabling environment for local administration education. For people to ‘breathe on their own,’ the government needs to ensure a clean atmosphere. Education should not be seen as a matter of control or power. The central authorities need to admit that they have not succeeded in providing a quality educational opportunity for all citizens. The central authorities can still define general standards, but then leave it up to the locality to achieve those in ways that are appropriate and consistent with the local context. The MOE should
not see itself as the sole provider of public basic education. Instead, it should play a facilitating and supportive role so that local administration and communities can manage the process themselves to create real-life, practical education for their youth.

**Summary**

From the review of related research and data from a panel of key informants across a range of positions related to provincial and sub-provincial education, it seems to be a unanimous feeling that past implementation of basic public education in Thailand has not been optimal. The standard curriculum from the central authorities has not significantly strengthened communities, since the goal of the program is more toward ultra-nationalism than local empowerment. The message of central education is that all Thais should be like the Central Thais. As long as this attitude prevails, it is hard to see how educational reform will succeed. Increasingly, Thailand will be forced to accept multiculturalism as national borders become more porous and information exchange becomes regionalized and even globalized. Indeed, Thailand could implement rapid education reform throughout the country if the nation truly devolves authority and trust to the local community to help manage basic education.

The key informants in this study believe that the LAOs in Lampang Province should manage basic education through a network system that will open up opportunities for learning in partnership with local residents, community organizations, and other social institutions. In that way, the local resources and wisdom can be applied to lifestyles and livelihoods and be sustained and passed on indefinitely. The communities will find ways to adapt the curriculum to reflect and build upon the strengths of the locality, while being an integral part of government development plans and the National Education Act of 1999.

A local curriculum in the case of Lampang, would reflect the local needs and challenges of the Lampang people. Students would learn about themselves and their environment and the potential to marshal local resources to overcome problems and obstacles. The Lampang curricula would necessarily reflect the diversity and complexity of development challenges throughout the province. To be accurately defined, the Lampang curricula would have to be developed through a process of active and full local
participation and linked with other communities through an education support network. The Lampang curricula would be dynamic and flexible, with the ability to be modified to incorporate unanticipated developments and social phenomena.

It is entirely appropriate that the LAO be the focal point for educational administration in the community to manage the implementation of a community-based curriculum. This will require extensive multi-sectoral collaboration and inter-generational sharing. At the heart of this effort is community empowerment and an alliance between the community and the education sector. Only in that way will the vision of “Education for All and All for Education” be realized.

**Recommendations**

Based on the findings of this research, the authors recommend that the government proceed with decentralization of authority for the entire system of educational administration to the local level. The zonal education service area offices can serve as a special kind of regional LAO, with managers and a board who are chosen by local, popular election, with the proviso that eligible candidates must meet the minimum standard qualifications in the education field and come from the locality. In addition, the education service area offices for primary and secondary education should be merged into a single entity. Currently, their separation is merely to serve the bureaucratic polity of the government and MOE and not for the benefit of the population. Indeed, these education service area offices should play a coordinating role for education policy and strategy, to ensure that local Thai education meets international standards.

**References**


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